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UNLOCKING THE “VIRTUAL CAGE” OF
WILDLIFE SURVEILLANCE
HENRY LININGER† AND TOM LININGER††

ABSTRACT
The electronic surveillance of wildlife has grown more extensive
than ever. For instance, thousands of wolves wear collars transmitting
signals to wildlife biologists.
Some collars inject wolves with
tranquilizers that allow for their immediate capture if they stray outside
of the boundaries set by anthropocentric management policies. Hunters
have intercepted the signals from surveillance collars and have used this
information to track and slaughter the animals. While the ostensible
reason for the surveillance programs is to facilitate the peaceful
coexistence of humanity and wildlife, the reality is less benign—an
outdoor version of Bentham’s Panopticon.
This Article reconceptualizes the enterprise of wildlife surveillance.
Without suggesting that animals have standing to assert constitutional
rights, the Article posits a public interest in protecting the privacy of
wildlife. The very notion of wildness implies privacy. The law already
protects the bodily integrity of animals to some degree, and a protected
zone of privacy is penumbral to this core protection, much the same way
that human privacy emanates from narrower guarantees against
government intrusion.
Policy implications follow that are akin to the rules under the
Fourth Amendment limiting the government’s encroachment on human
privacy. Just as the police cannot install a wiretap without demonstrating
a particularized investigative need for which all less intrusive methods
would be insufficient, so too should surveillance of wildlife necessitate a
specific showing of urgency. A detached, neutral authority should
review all applications for electronic monitoring of wildlife. Violations
of the rules should result in substantial sanctions. The Article concludes
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by considering—and refuting—foreseeable objections to heightened
requirements for the surveillance of wildlife.
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INTRODUCTION
What distinguishes wildlife from other forms of life? The sine qua
non of wildlife is freedom from domination. To be sure, humans are
capable of subjugating animals in a variety of ways. But when a human
exercises dominion over an animal, the animal is no longer “wild” in
any meaningful sense.1 Wildness is what separates an autonomous
creature in nature from a house cat or a dairy cow.

1. Martin Drenthen, a professor of environmental philosophy in the Netherlands, uses the
term “wild” to describe “species that have their own agency, that cannot fully be controlled.”
Martin Drenthen, The Return of the Wild in the Anthropocene: Wolf Resurgence in the
Netherlands, 18 ETHICS, POL’Y & ENVT. 318, 318–19 (2015) (discussing human reaction to the
return of wild wolves in the Netherlands); accord Reed Elizabeth Loder, Toward Reconciling
Environmental and Animal Ethics: Northeast Wolf Reintroduction, 10 J. ANIMAL & NATURAL
RESOURCE LAW 95, 127 (2014) (“Something wild is largely free of human control and able to
carry out the activities suited to its nature relatively unimpeded.”).
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One clear line of demarcation is freedom of movement. Wild
animals are free to roam. Animals in cages or enclosures lack this
freedom. The constraint of their movement extinguishes their wildness. An altruistic reason for the constraint does not change the fact
of captivity.2 Zoos are to wildness what prisons are to freedom.3
A more difficult question of taxonomy has arisen since humans
started affixing surveillance devices to wild animals. According to
Professor Etienne Benson at the University of Pennsylvania,
“American wildlife biologists incorporated Cold War-era surveillance
technologies into their practices in order to render wild animals and
their habitats legible and manageable.”4 Among other strategies,
biologists have trapped wild animals and outfitted them with telemetry
collars.5 The collars have grown more sophisticated over time and now
collect extensive data about metabolic changes as well as movement.6
Animals wearing these collars cannot escape the watchful eyes of their
monitors.7 Over 10,000 creatures currently wear electronic transmitters of some sort.8

2. Richard Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE L. J. 527, 539 (2001) (suggesting that even
when the enclosure of an animal amounts to “protective custody,” it is still “the antithesis of
freedom.”).
3. Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L.
REV. 325, 338 (2002) (arguing that by confining animals in zoos or their functional equivalents,
we are “giving up the wildness of nature and the ability of species to pursue their own evolutionary
destiny.”).
4. Etienne Benson, The Wired Wilderness: Electronic Surveillance and Environmental
Values in Wildlife Biology, PhD dissertation at MIT, 2 (2008) (tracing the evolution of wildlife
surveillance in the U.S. and around the world). Benson’s thesis evolved into a book, WIRED
WILDERNESS: TECHNOLOGIES OF TRACKING AND THE MAKING OF MODERN WILDLIFE 2
(Johns Hopkins University Press 2010).
5. Caleb Price, SMART Collars Reveal the Hidden Lives of Wolves, U.S. NATIONAL PARK
SERVICE (2015), www.nps.gov/articles/denali-smart-collars.htm (last accessed on July 7, 2016).
6. Id. (“The SMART (Species Movement, Acceleration, and Radio Tracking) collar . . .
simultaneously measures the geographic location, behavior, and physiology of the animal wearing
it.”); Bethany Augiliere, Beyond GPS: The Next High-Tech Frontier in Wild Animal Tracking,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Dec. 30, 2015 (noting that these sophisticated collars keep track of all
wolves’ activities). Biology Professor Terri Williams at U.C. Santa Cruz explained to the New
York Times that the collars allow biologists to monitor all aspects of the animals’ daily routine.
Kirk Johnson, ‘Smart Collar’ in the Works to Manage Wildlife Better, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2011
(“What you end up with is a diary for the animal, a 24-hour diary that says he spent this much
time sleeping, and we know from the GPS where that was . . .Then he woke up and went for a
walk over here. He caught something over here. He ate something and we know what it was
because the signatures we get for a deer kill vs. a rabbit kill are very different.”).
7. See Kirk Johnson, ‘Smart Collar’ in the Works to Manage Wildlife Better, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 2011.
8. According to Professor Terry Tempest Williams, the Tanner Scholar in Environmental
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When an animal is subject to unrelenting surveillance of its
location, diet and physiological reactions to external stimuli, is the
animal still wild? The modern use of surveillance collars—some of
which administer tranquilizers9 or shocks10 if animals travel too far—
restricts the freedom of animals by “erect[ing] a virtual cage” around
them, according to Holly Doremus, a professor of environmental law
at Berkeley.11 The surveillance collar itself is a draconian device that
French philosopher Gilles Deleuze associated with nightmarish
“societies of control.”12 A New York Times column on the new hightech strategies for wildlife management described “operations that
read like science fiction about humans trapped in a game reserve
managed by alien overlords.”13 The historical view of animals as
soulless, subordinate species14 might abide such treatment, but the
Humanities at the University of Utah, “[t]ens of thousands of animals in the United States are
numbered and scanned, then monitored through biological surveillance.” TERRY TEMPEST
WILLIAMS, FINDING BEAUTY IN A BROKEN WORLD 113 (Vintage 2009).
9. Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being Wild, 23 HARV.
ENVT’L L. REV. 1, 60 (1999) (reporting that U.S. Department of Interior “routinely installs
monitoring devices such as radio-equipped collars on reintroduced animals, monitoring the
population to ensure that it stays within a designated area . . . Interior agreed to fit the wolves
with ‘capture collars’ designed to deliver a sedative dose in response to a radio signal”); see also
INTERNATIONAL WOLF CENTER, www.wolf.org/programs/educator-resources-wolf-link/trackwild-wolves/ (last accessed July 7, 2016) (“These special radio collars can also be equipped with
darts holding a tranquilizer, which can be triggered from a distance. This allows researchers to
easily recapture an animal.”).
10. Candace Gaukel Andrews, a columnist for the World Wildlife Fund, has reported that
wildlife managers have designed wolf collars that can give painful shocks if the wolves stray
outside of approved areas. Candace Gaukel Andrews, Traditional Tracking vs. Electronic
Surveillance: Has Wildlife Management Become Too High-Tech?, April 2, 2013,
www.goodnature.nathab.com/traditional-tracking-vs.-electronic-surveillance-has-wildliferesearch-become-too-high-tech/ (last accessed on July 7, 2016) (“But wildlife radio tracking has
created concerns as well as capabilities; it has provided opportunities for connection as well as for
control. It’s been reported, for instance, that shock collars have been tested on wolves. When
the wolves tried to roam beyond a fence of sensors controlled by satellite, they were shocked.”).
11. Doremus, supra note 9, at 60 (“These direct control measures erect a virtual cage around
the animals, converting them from wild creatures into semidomesticated ones.”).
12. Giles Deleuze, Postscript on the Societies of Control, OCTOBER 3, 7 (Winter 1992) (“The
conception of a control mechanism, giving the position of any element within an open
environment at any given instant (whether animal in a reserve or human in a corporation, as with
an electronic collar), is not necessarily one of science fiction.”).
13. Daniel Duane, The Unnatural Kingdom: If Technology Helps Us Save the Wilderness,
Will the Wilderness Be Wild?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2016 (describing wildlife management strategy
involving surveillance collars and forced movement).
14. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS, Louis Infield, trans., 239 (The
Century Co. 1930) (“Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end.
That end is man.”) Kant could tolerate cruel practices such as vivisection because of they are
valuable to man. “Vivisectionists, who use living animals for the experiments, certainly act
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modern naturalist despairs at the sight of a wild creature encumbered
by a bulky radio transmitter.15
Although we intuitively sense that fastening spy gear to an
animal’s neck is incongruous with wildness,16 virtually no scholarship
has proposed a doctrine of wildlife privacy. A few authors have
lamented the lack of wildlife privacy without suggesting any new rules
to address the problem.17 In fact, to the extent that legal scholars18 and
animal researchers19 have considered the topic of privacy in the great
cruelly, although their aim is praiseworthy, and they can justify their cruelty, since animals must
be regarded as man’s instruments.” Id.
15. See Williams, supra note 8, at 113 (describing birds “burdened by radio collars dangling
around their long, thin necks”).
16. National Park Service, Wolf Monitoring 1986-2014. Denali National Park & Preserve,
https://www.nps.gov/articles/denali-wolf-monitoring.htm (last visited July 7, 2016) (“So, how
exactly can a collar measure metabolic costs of wolf activities in the wilds of Denali? The answer
is surprisingly anything but wild.”).
17. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 113 (offering no policy proposals, but raising the
question, “If wildlife is tagged, painted and weighed with transmitters, do the animals become less
wild?”); Duane, supra note 13 (indicating that “I would miss the unmanipulated wild if it entirely
disappeared,” but offering no suggestions for new rules) Brandon Keim, Should Animals Have a
Right to Privacy?, BACKCHANNEL Jan. 25, 2016, www.backchannel.com/ should-animals-havea-right-to-privacy-ddce06d1a094#j14c0js8s (last accessed on July 7, 2016) (“How might animal
privacy become a legal right rather than a cultural custom? Should it? I don’t know. These are
complicated questions.”); Brett Mills, Why We Should Consider the Privacy of Animals, THE
GUARDIAN, Apr. 30, 2010 (criticizing intrusiveness of wildlife documentaries and “wondering
whether it’s appropriate to think about” animals’ privacy).
18. E.g., Ed Haden & Adam Israel, The Fourth Amendment, Game Wardens, and Hunters,
46 CUMB. L. REV. 79 (2015–16) (urging that game wardens should be subject to stricter Fourth
Amendment standards when they search hunters); Katerina Kuh, Environmental Privacy, 2015
UTAH L. REV. 1 (2015) (arguing that hunters and other humans causing environmental harm
should not be able to invoke privacy protections in order to prevent government surveillance of
these activities); Bryan Mull, The Hidden Cost of Rod and Rifle: Why State Fish and Game Laws
Must Be Amended in Order to Protect Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure in the Great
Outdoors, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 801 (2013) (contending that anglers and hunters need stronger
protection from searches by officials enforcing fish and game laws); Edwin Butterfoss and Joseph
Day, State v. Colosimo: Minnesota Anglers’ Freedom from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Becomes “The One That Got Away,” 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 527 (2004) (criticizing decision
by Minnesota Supreme Court that allowed fish and game officers wide latitude to search fishing
vessels); Donald Douglas, A Comment on Louisiana Wildlife Agents and Probable Cause: Are
Random Game Checks Constitutional?, 53 LA. L. REV. 525 (1992) (analyzing whether hunters may
assert constitutional rights when wildlife agents conduct searches without probable cause).
19. The ethical guidelines for animal researchers virtually never make reference to the
privacy of animals. When a guideline calls for the protection of privacy in field research involving
animals, chances are that the guideline is referring to the privacy of humans who live near the
animals. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR ETHICAL CONDUCT IN THE CARE AND USE OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS IN RESEARCH, Feb. 24, 2012, www.ap
a.org/science/leadership/ care/ guidelines.aspx. The following lang-uage appears under the
heading “Field Research”: “Research in populated areas must be done with respect for the
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outdoors, they have generally focused on the privacy of humans, not
animals.20 The time has come to make wildlife the focus of a discussion
about privacy in the wilderness.
This Article suggests that nonhuman species deserve some degree
of privacy. Rather than attempt to extend a constitutional privacy right
to wildlife, this Article conceives of privacy as a penumbra of the
current statutory scheme protecting the welfare of wild animals. As
the Supreme Court famously determined in Griswold v. Connecticut,
humans derive their privacy rights from a penumbra of other rights
enumerated in the Constitution.21 If a constitutional penumbra is an
adequate basis for human privacy, perhaps a statutory penumbra could
support a limited notion of privacy for wild animals.
How can a doctrine of wildlife privacy help to regulate the use of
surveillance collars on animals? Imputing privacy to animals presents
the opportunity to import a basic version of the familiar privacy-based
regulations that govern searches and seizures in the context of criminal
investigations. Of course, these rules should not be as strict as their
counterparts under the Fourth Amendment, but they should cover
some of the same ground: demanding a particularized showing of need
for surveillance, requiring insufficiency of less intrusive alternatives,
limiting the scope and duration of surveillance, mandating review of
applications by a neutral third party, requiring separate authorization
and a higher level of urgency for seizures or lethal measures, and
sanctioning noncompliance with meaningful penalties.22
A wide-ranging discussion of wildlife privacy and its application to
all species in all locations would be too expansive to engage in here.
Instead, this Article will develop its argument by focusing on one
species, the gray wolf. No mammal in the United States has evoked
stronger feelings of loathing—and, more recently in certain circles,
admiration—than the wolf.23
Wildlife managers have collared

property and privacy or the inhabitants of the area.” While this sentence does not refer explicitly
to humans, the context makes clear that humans are the focus: only humans own property.
20. Even wildlife advocacy groups seem to associate privacy more with humans than with
wildlife. A Google search on June 6, 2016 using the words wildlife, privacy and policy did not
turn up proposals to protect the privacy of wildlife, but did yield a long list of links to web pages
in which conservation groups promised not to disclose information about their human donors.
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. See, e.g., id.
23. Tom Murphy, EARTHJUSTICE, July 22, 2015, http://earthjustice.org/blog/ (“People either
love [wolves] or hate them.”).
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thousands of wolves,24 and while the resulting surveillance has helped
the wolves’ recovery in some respects, it has also caused serious
hardships ranging from loss of privacy to death.25
The topic of surveillance collars on wolves has become particularly
urgent in light of a recently approved amendment by the U.S. House
of Representatives that would end all federal funding for wolf
conservation.26 The purpose of the legislation is to give states most of
the responsibility for monitoring wolves with collars.27 Some state
officials have declared that they intend to track down and shoot most
wolves within their jurisdictions.28 For example, state officials in
Alaska and Idaho seem to kill wolves whenever the opportunity arises,
and surveillance collars make this task easier.29 Sometimes the states’
hunters collar a “Judas wolf” that leads them back to its pack; the

24. For a breakdown showing total collared wolves by jurisdiction, see infra, Part I.
25. For a list of potential harms relating to collaring, see infra, Part II.
26. Associated Press, Plan for Federal Wolf Delisting Clears House, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2016
(reporting that delisting would take effect in 2017). The momentum for such legislation will be
stronger under the new Trump Administration, according to Amaroq Weiss, a former attorney
with the Center for Biological Diversity. Amaroq Weiss, Can California’s Wolves Survive
Trump’s America?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 22, 2016.
27. Hillary Corrigan, Gray Wolf Listing Targeted in Amendment to Funding Bill, BEND
BULLETIN, July 15, 2016 (noting that House amendment would give states control over wolves).
28. Jim Robbins, For Wolves, A Recovery May Not Be the Blessing It Seems, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2007 (reporting that Idaho governor planned to reduce the state’s wolf population from
650 to 100, and he said that, “I’m prepared to bid for that first ticket to shoot a wolf myself”); see
Idaho Lawmakers Approve Spending $400,000 to Kill Wolves, www.localnews8.com, Mar. 8, 2016
(Idaho killed 78 wolves in 2015, and Idaho’s legislature appropriated $400,000 to kill more in the
future); Krista Lanlois, Wolf Wars: Alaska’s Republican Governors Find Vicious Ways to Kill
Predators and Mark Their Territory with the Feds, SLATE, Oct. 31, 2014 (noting that a succession
of Alaska governors vowed to reduce wolf populations).
29. Ken Fischman, A Modest Proposal: One Solution to Idaho’s Wolf Problem, BOISE
WEEKLY, Jan. 13, 2016 (discussing wolf advocates’ criticism that “radio-collaring wolf pups will
enable agents to more easily track and find wolves in order to kill” them); Tim Preso, Idaho
Breaks Agreement Using Holicopter Drops to Collar Wolves in Frank Church Wilderness,
Earthjustice, Jan. 13, 2016, http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2016/idaho-breaks-agreementusing-helicopter-drops-to-collar-wolves-in-frank-church-wilderness (“There is every reason to
believe that these new wolf collars will be used by a state trapper to locate wolves for the purpose
of killing them.”); Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar,
2011 WL 6980674 *28 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (indicating that in Idaho, “[s]ome of the wolves
killed via aerial gunning by state agents are being tracked by radio collars initially implemented
for the purpose of scientific research.”); cf. Corbin Hiar, NPS Abandons Study After Alaska
Shoots Research Animals, ENVT. & ENERGY NEWS, Aug. 8, 2016 (“The state of Alaska has
gunned down so many radio-collared wolves outside the Yukon-Charley Rivers National
Preserve that the National Park Service has abandoned a 23-year-old study of the predators.”).
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collared wolf then watches the hunters kill its entire pack but is spared
so the hunters can slaughter the next pack that it joins.30
The argument for wildlife privacy will proceed in several analytical
steps. Part I will discuss the increasing use of telemetry collars to
monitor wolves. Part II will analyze how this surveillance harms
wolves. Part III will survey the government’s current regulation of wolf
surveillance. Part IV will propose a new doctrine of wildlife privacy.
Part V will explore the policy implications of the privacy-based model,
and will advocate the importation of certain Fourth Amendment
principles to the context of wildlife surveillance. Part VI will consider
foreseeable objections to this Article’s arguments and proposals.
I. INCREASING USE OF SURVEILLANCE COLLARS
Telemetry collars came into widespread use as part of the
initiative to reintroduce gray wolves in the United States. Before the
arrival of Europeans in North America, gray wolves numbered in the
hundreds of thousands.31 Settlers spread west and wiped out entire
wolf populations.32 By the 1930s, the gray wolf had nearly disappeared
from forty-eight states.33 In the 1980s, the Department of the Interior
(“DOI”) launched a program to transplant gray wolves from Canada
into the Northern Rocky Mountain region of the United States.34
Proponents of this plan sought to mollify critics by classifying the
relocated wolves as an “experimental, nonessential population” under
30. Cathy Taibbi, USDA-Collared “Judas Wolves” Used Over and Over to Lead Killers to
Their
Families,
TIMBER
WOLF
INFORMATION
NETWORK,
Feb.
26,
2016
http://www.timberwolfinformation.org/usda-collared-judas-wolves-used-over-and-over-to-leadkillers-to-their-families/ (discussing Idaho officials’ use of Judas wolf); Hiar, supra note 29
(reporting Alaska’s use of Judas wolves).
31. Julie Thrower, Ranching with Wolves: Reducing Conflicts between Livestock and Wolves
through Integrated Grazing and Wolf Management Plans, 29 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
319, 319 (2009) (estimating that there were over 200,000 wolves in the grasslands and plains of
North America before Europeans arrived on this continent).
32. Professor Jon Coleman at Notre Dame has chronicled how European settlers and their
descendants zealously exterminated wolves. JON COLEMAN, VICIOUS: WOLVES AND MEN IN
AMERICA (2004).
33. W. Ryan Stephens, Gray Wolf Rising: Why the Clash over Wolf Management in the
Northern Rockies Calls for Congressional Action to Define “Recover” under the Endangered
Species Act, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 917, 919 (2012) (explaining that the wolf
“had nearly been eradicated throughout the lower forty-eight states by the 1930s,” except for
small populations in northern Michigan and Minnesota).
34. Emily Cowan Brown, The “Wholly Separate” Truth: Did the Yellowstone Wolf Reintroduction Violate Section 10(J) of the Endangered Species Act, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 425,
436–41 (2000) (summarizing the steps taken by the Department of the Interior, and the Fish and
Wildlife Service in particular, to reintroduce the gray wolf in the United States).

Lininger - For Publication (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2017]

UNLOCKING THE “VIRTUAL CAGE”

6/7/2017 1:30 PM

215

Section 10(j) of the Endangered Species Act.35 This classification made
it easier to kill wolves whenever there were conflicts with humans and
livestock.36 Some observers have lamented the designation because it
seems paradoxical. How could gray wolves be both important and
expendable?37
DOI directed wildlife managers to devise a strategy for keeping
track of the reintroduced wolves.38 DOI’s regulations indicated that
surveillance collars were one possible means of monitoring.39 Wildlife
managers began using the collars for three purposes. First, the collars
provided a wealth of information about the wolves including their
numbers, range, predation, and habits.40 Second, the collars helped the
managers keep wolves away from livestock and human communities.41
Third, the data from the collars allowed the wildlife managers to
promote certain wolves as celebrities, drawing a large following on the
internet42 and fueling a multi-million dollar tourist industry in and
around national parks.43

35. Ted Williams, Should Wolves Stay Protected Under the Endangered Species Act?, YALE
ENVT. 360, July 18, 2013, http://e360.yale.edu/features/should_wolves_stay_protected_under_end
angered_species_act (recounting political circumstances at this time and arguing that if the
Department of the Interior had not been willing to use this special designation for the
reintroduced wolf population, “wolf recovery was impossible”).
36. Id.
37. Kieran Suckling, executive director of the Center for Biological Diversity, indicated that
the status is risky for the gray wolves because “we have maximum discretion to kill them” and
“we have few to no long-term commitments about the management of these populations.”
(quoted in IRUS BRAVERMAN, WILD LIFE: THE INSTITUTION OF NATURE 164 (2015)).
38. 50 CFR § 17.84 (2015). (“The reintroduced wolves will be monitored during the life of
the project.”).
39. Id. (mentioning “the use of radio telemetry” as a way to monitor the reintroduced
wolves).
40. See Thomas Meier et. al, Tracking the Movement of Denali’s Wolves, NATIONAL PARK
SERVICE, (last visited Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.nps.gov/articles/aps-v5-i1-c8.htm.
41. Doremus, supra note 7, at 60 (discussing how wildlife officials have used surveillance
collars to minimize conflicts between wolves and humans; if the collars indicate that wolves have
gone outside of the approved areas, managers tranquilize and move them).
42. Associated Press, New Website Maps Celebrity Wolf OR-7’s Travels, OREGON LIVE
(Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2012/01/new_websit
e_maps_celebrity_wol.html (“People interested in the far-flung wanderings of Oregon’s celebrity wolf, OR-7, can keep up with his progress on a new website.”).
43. Stephens, supra note 30, at 944 (“wolves add an estimated thirty-five million dollars to
the Yellowstone region’s economy from the tens of thousands of tourists who come to watch
them.”).
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The use of surveillance collars came to pervade virtually the entire
wolf habitat in the United States.44 A conservative estimate is that
wildlife managers have attached surveillance collars to thousands of
wolves.45 Areas with large populations of collared wolves include
Denali National Park,46 Yellowstone National Park,47 Arizona,48
Idaho,49 Michigan,50 Minnesota,51 Montana,52 New Mexico,53 North

44. ROBERT BUSCH, THE WOLF ALMANAC, NEW AND REVISED: A CELEBRATION OF
WOLVES AND THEIR WORLD 216 (2007) (“In fact, for the past three decades, collar-crazy
biologists have swarmed over most of the wolf’s north American habitat.”).
45. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, Wolf Information Continued¸ https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/
nature/wolfinfo.htm (explaining that in Yellowstone alone “US Fish and Wildlife Service in 2013
estimated about 1,592 wolves and 71 breeding pairs in the Northern Rocky Mountain Distinct
Population Segment including areas of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming.”).
46. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, WOLF MONITORING 1986-2014 (2014) (“More than 400
wolves have been captured and collared” in Denali National Park alone.).
47. See Gordon Hunt, Meet Doug, the wolf watcher of Yellowstone National Park, (July 8,
2015), https://www.siliconrepublic.com/discovery/meet-doug-smith-wolf-watcher-yellowstoneNational-park (explaining Doug Smith’s role in “[t]racking the 100 wild wolves incessantly, his
team collar up to 20 a year, keeping tabs on the animals’ movement, hunting habits, pack traits,
biology and disease.”).
48. Mexican Wolf Interagency Field Team, Monthly Status Report, (May 20, 2016), http://ww
w.mexicanwolves.org/index.php/news/1648/51/mexican-wolf-reintroduction-%20project-news
(“At the end of April 2016, the wild Mexican wolf population consisted of 53 wolves with
functional radio collars,” some of which were in Arizona and some in New Mexico).
49. See John O’Connell, Biologist changing way wolves are tracked, CAPITAL PRESS, Dec.
4, 2015, 11:51 AM), http://www.capitalpress.com/Livestock/20151204/biologist-changing-way-wo
lves-are-tracked (explaining that “There are currently 88 collared wolves in Idaho.”).
50. Keith Creagh, Michigan Wolf Management Program, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES (Jun 11, 2015), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/dnr/wolf_manage
ment_plan_492568_7.pdf.
51. Website of International Wolf Center, Track Wild Wolves, INTERNATIONAL WOLF
CENTER, http://www.wolf.org/programs/educator-resources-wolf-link/track-wild-wolves/ (last
visited on July 11, 2016) (explaining “[m]ore than 700 wolves have been tracked in northern
Minnesota. . . .”).
52. Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, Montana Gray Wolf Conservation
and Management 2015 Annual Report 14 (Mar. 26, 2016), http://fwp.mt.gov/fishandwildlife/mana
gement/wolf/ (last visited on July 11, 2016) (indicating that in 2015, state officials monitored
“[f[ifty radio-collared wolves in 32 packs.”).
53. Mexican Wolf Interagency Field Team, Monthly Status Report, (May 20, 2016),
http://www.mexicanwolves.org/index.php/news/1648/51/mexican-wolf-reintroduction%20project-news (“At the end of April 2016, the wild Mexican wolf population consisted of 53
wolves with functional radio collars,” some of which were in Arizona and some in New Mexico).
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Carolina,54 Oregon,55 Washington, and Wyoming.56 Some wildlife
managers aspire to monitor every pack within their territorial
jurisdiction by collaring at least one wolf per pack.57 In other words, we
may be approaching a time in which every wolf in the U.S. is under
direct or indirect surveillance. The number of wolves wearing collars
continues to increase in part due to the increasing population of
wolves58 as well as the declining cost of collars.59
The technology of the collars has advanced rapidly over the years.
The earliest versions of the collars emitted VHF signals that managers
could monitor with receivers as long as they were in range.60 Newer
collars use GPS technology, which allows for monitoring from a remote
location.61 In recent years, researchers have devised an array of sensors
for the collars that measure various metabolic functions62 so as to
provide a “daily diary” of the wolves’ activities.63 Researchers can use
54. Bruce Siceloff, Conservations protest as red wolf numbers fall, Charlotte News and
Observer (Apr. 2, 2016), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article69609417.htm
(explaining that “there are nearly 40 collared wolves” in North Carolina).
55. See Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, Oregon Wolf Conservation and Management 2015 Annual Report 2 (Mar. 18, 2016), dfw.state.or.us/wolves/docs/oregon_wolf_ program/
2015-annual-wolf-report-3-18-16-FINAL.pdf (last visited on July 11, 2016) (explaining
“throughout the year as many as 21 GPS radio-collared wolves were monitored”).
56. See Wyoming Game and Fishing Department, Wyoming Gray Wolf Population
Monitoring and Management Interim Report, (Jan. 1 2014), https://www.fws.gov/mountainprairie/es/species/mammals/wolf/annualrpt14/2014_Wyoming_Annual_Report.pdf (noting that
“[s]eventy radio-collared wolves . . . were being monitored in Wyoming.”).
57. See, e.g., Ann McCreary, Loup Loup pack wolves fitted with radio collars for monitoring, METHOW VALLEY NEWS (July 8, 2016), http://methowvalleynews.com/2016/05/26/lo up-lou
p-pack-wolves-fitted-with-radio-collars-for-monitoring/ (explaining “[s]tate wildlife officials are
working to capture and place radio collars on at least wolf in every pack in order to monitor the
pack’s activities.”).
58. Alex Sakariassen, Collaring the Wild, MISSOULA INDEPENDENT, Sept. 11, 2014 (noting
“the wolf population—and, subsequently, the number of collars in the wild—has increased.”).
59. See Merritt Clifton, Field Mortalities in Wildlife Research: It’s Time for a Conversation,
ANIMALS 24-7 (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.animals24-7.org/2014/08/13/field-mortalities-inwildlife-research-its-time-for-a-conversation/ (explaining “[r]adio-tracking technology has
improved [in the last few years]—and the price of the needed equipment has plummeted,
enabling more and more researchers to tag more and more animals.”).
60. VHF signals are radio frequencies that can only travel a limited distance. See DAVID
MECH, A CRITIQUE OF WILDLIFE RADIO-TRACKING AND ITS USE IN NATIONAL PARKS: A
REPORT TO THE U.S. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 11-20 (2002), http://npshistory.com/publication
s/wildlife/radio-tracking-2002.pdf (providing a detailed discussion of VHF radio collars).
61. Id. at 23–29 (discussing GPS telemetry and contrasting it with older VHS system).
62. Price, supra note 7 (“The SMART (Species Movement, Acceleration, and Radio
Tracking) collar . . . simultaneously measures the geographic location, behavior, and physiology
of the animal wearing it.”).
63. Johnson, supra note 5 (quoting biology professor Terri Williams at U.C. Santa Cruz, who
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the collars to monitor when, how and where the wolves eat, socialize,
mate, and interact with their pups.64 The new collars also have features
designed to control wolves in a manner that exemplifies Foucauldian
biopower.65 Some collars can inject wolves with tranquilizer darts66
while others are capable of administering painful shocks.67 Wildlife
managers can use these features to keep wolves from crossing certain
boundaries in management areas.68 The degree of control exerted by
modern collars is so great that one conservationist facetiously
suggested wildlife managers should devise a collar to detect the odor
of livestock and inject wolves with poison if they come too near this
forbidden prey.69

said that, “What you end up with is a diary for the animal, a 24-hour diary that says he spent this
much time sleeping, and we know from the GPS where that was . . . . Then he woke up and went
for a walk over here. He caught something over here. He ate something and we know what it
was because the signatures we get for a deer kill vs. a rabbit kill are very different.”); see Bethany
Augiliere, Beyond GPS: The Next High-Tech Frontier in Wild Animal Tracking, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN, Dec. 30, 2015 (noting that sophisticated collars keep track of all wolves’ activities).
64. See Emily Anthes, Tracking the Pack, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.c
om/2013/02/04/opinion/tracking-the-pack.html (explaining “the use of wildlife tags has proliferated as the devices have become smaller and more powerful . . . Is this particular predator a
pack leader or a lone wolf? A dedicated hunter or a mooch? How much time does it spend with
its pups? Who are its associates, rivals and mates?”).
65. JACK TURNER, TRAVELS IN THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE 58 (St. Martin’s 2009)
(“Unfortunately, collaring is also a means of control . . . A collar entails a power relationship.
There is nothing wilder than wolves and more symbolic of wildness. To collar a wolf says a lot
about our attitude toward the wild”); Sara Rinfret, Controlling Animals: Power, Foucault, and
Species Management, 22 SOCIETY & NAT. RES. 571, 575 (2009) (applying Foucauldian philosophy
in analyzing government’s use of “tracking devices to monitor and modify the movements” of
wolves); see Braverman, supra note 34, at 13 (“Although Foucault admittedly uses the term
‘biopower’ only to describe the project of governing human bodies populations and life, Wild Life
joins a growing scholarship that extends the scope of biopolitics to the realm of governing
nonhuman animals.”).
66. See MECH, supra note 60(“Researchers locate the animal via telemetry and then signal
its collar to fire a dart containing drugs into the animal. The collars are also equipped with a
back-up dart. The researchers then follow the signal until the animal is under the effects of the
injected drugs.”)
67. See Jason Hawley et al., Assessment of Shock Collars as Nonlethal Management for
Wolves in Wisconsin, 73 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 518, 522–23 (2009) (discussing use of shock collars
on wolves).
68. Doremus, supra note 9, at 60 (reporting use of capture collars to control wolves).
69. Fischman, supra note 28 (using in the satirical tone of Jonathan Swift, proposing that
wolf collars “be furnished with remote scent detectors and strychnine self-injection devices, which
could be adjusted in such a manner that if wolves were to approach domestic livestock within a
certain distance (let us say 50 feet), the strychnine injector could be automatically triggered to
deliver a lethal dose to the wolf that would kill it within seconds.”).
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The use of surveillance collars enjoys strong support in certain
circles of wildlife managers and biologists.70 To be sure, most of these
people have a sincere interest in helping wolves,71 and they believe that
surveillance collars will enhance the wolves’ odds of survival.72 But
there are many factors that lead to an excessive emphasis on collars.
These devices allow humans to “turn nature’s dials” to an
unprecedented extent,73 and it is hard to resist the temptation to use
such powerful technology.74 Professor Etienne Benson wrote that
researchers became enamored with radio telemetry: “Wedding
Americans’ fascination with the wild to their equally fervent
enthusiasm for technology, the rise of radio tracking as the privileged
mode of knowing wild animals seemed both ironic and inevitable.”75
The radio collar came to epitomize man’s dominion over nature — a
gratifying notion for the few who could utilize this equipment.76 The
technophiles also found that their use of surveillance collars generated
ample data that they could present in scholarly journals,77 thereby

70. Busch, supra note 44 (referring to “collar-crazy biologists” who gather information about
wolves); see Zoe Jewell, Effect of Monitoring Technique on Quality of Conservation Science, 27
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 501, 501 (2013) (explaining “[i]n the last few decades, there has been
an enthusiastic adoption of invasive techniques for gathering ecological and conservation data.”);
id at 505 (decrying the “slavish addiction to GPS telemetry.”).
71. Duane, supra note 13 (while disturbing in some respects, the increasing use of technology
in the wilderness is well intentioned; “hardworking biologists—thank heaven—use the best tools
available to protect whatever wild creatures remain.”); accord Yellowstone Park Foundation,
supra note 37 (discussing the value of data that wildlife biologists have obtained through their use
of collars on wolves).
72. Paul Henson & Kurt Melcher, Why Wolves Should Continue to Wear Radio Collars,
THE OREGONIAN (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/12/why_w
olves_should_continue_to.html (explaining , for example, Paul Henson, Oregon state supervisor
for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Kurt Melcher, interim director for the Oregon
Department of Fish and Wildlife, made an earnest case to continue the practice of collaring
wolves despite criticism of the infringement on wolves’ wildness and privacy).
73. See generally Duane, supra note 13 (explaining that the high-tech “infrastructure is
proliferating and improving so quickly, thanks to advances in digital technology, that wildlife
managers are seizing more and more of nature’s relevant dials—predator and prey alike—and
turning those dials to keep nature looking the way we want it to.”).
74. ETIENNE BENSON, WIRED WILDERNESS: TECHNOLOGIES OF TRACKING AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN WILDLIFE 2 (2010) (noting that of the various techniques used by
biologists to monitor wildlife, none has “inspired so many encomiums to the potential for
technology to ‘save nature’ as wildlife radio tracking or radiotelemetry.”).
75. Id.
76. Id. (referencing a historian who views radio collar as ‘the perfect symbol of our efforst to
come to terms with out knowledge of nature’s order, our power over it.”).
77. See generally BUSCH, supra note 44, at 216 (observing that “the use of radio collars,
widely used since 1960s, has now made the wolf a favorite research target.”).
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enhancing their professional stature. A large-scale collaring operation
could bring in significant grant money as well.78 For these reasons, the
proponents of surveillance collars continue to rely heavily on this
technique, even as critics have raised concerns about potentially
detrimental consequences.79
II. HARMS CAUSED BY COLLARS
This Part will survey a wide range of possible harms that could
result from the use of telemetry collars on wolves. The purpose of this
Part is not to argue that the harms of surveillance always outweigh the
benefits; on the contrary, there may very well be instances in which the
instrumental value of data derived from the collars80 justifies any
hardship that the surveillance entails.81 Rather, the point of itemizing
78. TURNER, supra note 65, at 58 (mentioning that the collaring of wolves can be “a well
funded, open-ended science project for federal, state and academic biologists, and a fresh
marketing ploy for conservation foundations.”).
79. See Andrews, supra note 10 (“While researchers are aware of the limitations and dangers
of telemetry, other factors—such as a seemingly insatiable appetite for new and improved
gadgetry—often take precedence.”); Busch, supra note 44 (“In the rush to gather data [about
wolves], the human aspects of biology are sometimes left behind.”).
80. Some critics have disputed the value of the data obtained through continued use of
surveillance collars. Professor Terry Tempest Williams, the Tanner Scholar in Environmental
Humanities at the University of Utah, has expressed doubts that further telemetry can add
substantially to our understanding of the collared animals’ biology, at least by comparison to other
less intrusive surveillance techniques. “I think about the ethics of wild animals being tagged and
collared, the grizzlies and wolves of Yellowstone . . . Tens of thousands of animals in the United
States are numbered and scanned, then monitored through biological surveillance. What are we
learning that we didn’t know? That we couldn’t learn simply by observation?” TERRY TEMPEST
WILLIAMS, FINDING BEAUTY IN A BROKEN WORLD 113 (2009). Professor Etienne Benson, while
noting certain benefits of radiotracking wildlife, also pointed out some of the limitations:
“Radiotracking produced large amounts of movement data that could be easily quantified, but
that did not necessarily have any connection to the environment in which the movements took
place.” Etienne Benson, Minimal Animal: Surveillance, Simulation and Stochasticity in Wildlife
Biology, 30 ANTENNAE 39, 49 (2014); see Susan Rehm-Westoff, All About Those Collars,

LEGENDS OF LAMAR VALLEY, www.legendoflamarvalley.com/ all-about-those-collars/
(last visited on July 12, 2016) (noting the criticism that “we have learned enough about wild
wolves and they should now be left to live in peace without the weight of a collar around their
neck”); Larry Thorngren, Yellowstone Researcher Has Collared 759 Wolves, Nov. 1, 2010,
www.thewildphotographer.com/ 2010/11/yellowstone-wolf-researcher-has.html (criticizing
the continued use of wolf collars at Yellowstone National Park because “[a]ny useful information
was retrieved years ago and the study is now is more about locating wolves for tourists to watch
than for any biological reason” and alleging that”[n]ot one wolf has been helped by the study and
759 Yellowstone wolves have been treated like lab rats.”).
81. It is undeniable that past surveillance of wolves has advanced our understanding of the
species and has aided recovery in certain contexts. For example, Doug Smith, leader of the
Yellowstone Wolf Project and one of the foremost experts on wolf biology, derived a great deal
of his insight into the species by collaring and monitoring hundreds of Yellowstone wolves. See

Lininger - For Publication (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2017]

UNLOCKING THE “VIRTUAL CAGE”

6/7/2017 1:30 PM

221

all the possible deleterious effects is to allow a careful marginal analysis
that takes account of harms and benefits for every increment of
surveillance.82
The following Subparts will discuss several categories of problems
caused by surveillance collars. The collars can harm wolves by
inflicting physical injury, reducing privacy, or some combination of the
two.83 In addition to the harms that befall wolves, the collaring and
segregation of wolves can disrupt entire ecosystems. The mistreatment
of wolves can even harm humans, as it fosters a prejudice that has led
to victimization of humans who seem to share certain wolf-like
characteristics.
A. Harms to Collared Wolves
One of the biggest hazards associated with collaring is the high
rate of injury that occurs at the time of capture. Trapping sometimes
results in broken bones, lacerations, or even death.84 The alternative
Yellowstone Park Foundation, Collars Are Key to Wolf Studies, Oct. 19, 2010,
http://www.ypf.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5473 (listing various benefits of
monitoring wolves with collars); cf., Duane, supra note 13 (“There had not been a wolf sighting
in California since 1924, so OR-7’s walkabout—and the fact that he wore a collar— was
responsible for the listing of gray wolves as a California endangered species.”). The question
remains, however, whether each future increment of surveillance is justifiable in a marginal costbenefit analysis. The fact that past surveillance led to useful discoveries does not necessarily
warrant indefinite continuation of surveillance—especially because surveillance of animals by
biologists (unlike, say, observation of a particular criminal suspect by police) generally can
provide cumulate benefits that apply outside the context of the particular investigation.
82. According to Paul Joslin, director of research at Wolf Haven International, “current
technologies for catching them are so traumatic that wolves should not be caught unless there is
a reasonable expectation that the results will have some potential positive benefit for the animals
involved.” Paul Joslin, quoted in Busch, supra note 44, at 216 (describing harm to wolves trapped
for collaring). One academic has noted the irony that increasing human knowledge of wolves has
not necessarily redounded to the benefit of the wolves. COLEMAN, supra note 32, at 81 (“Whereas
luck once brought humans and wolves together, now pricey gadgets allow people to spy on the
elusive beasts. Humans know more about wolves today than at any time in the two species’ eonslong association on this planet. Ironically, this knowledge has accumulated at a low point in this
relationship. Human beings learned about wolves at the same time as they pushed the animals to
the edge of extinction. Enlightenment and annihilation occurred in tandem.”).
83. Brandon Keim, Should Animals Have a Right to Privacy?, BACKCHANNEL (Jan. 25,
2016), www.backchannel.com/should-animals-have-a-right-to-privacy-ddce06d1a094#j14c0js8s
(arguing that, for collared animals, “privacy is intertwined with physical protection.”).
84. “Unfortunately, many of the wolves caught for radio-collaring are injured during the
trapping process. In one study of 109 wolves live-captured in Minnesota and Alaska from 1969
to 1976, 41 percent had skin lacerations, dislocations, or broken bones because of trap injuries.
Almost half (46 percent) had tooth, lip, or gum injuries caused by the wolves’ attempts to chew
off the trap.” Busch, supra note 44, at 216. Zoe Jewell, an adjunct associate professor at Duke’s
Nicholas School of the Environment, has noted that “invasive techniques, relying on capture and
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of shooting wolves with tranquilizer darts can also cause injuries
because the wounds from the darts can become infected, and the
sedatives used in the darts are occasionally toxic.85 Ed Bangs, a Forest
Service employee who collared a large number of wolves when he
supervised the reintroduction in the Northern Rocky Mountain region,
estimated that two percent of the captured wolves died.86 Even those
that survive without physical injury experience lasting psychological
effects, as the trauma of capture leads to a phenomenon akin to
posttraumatic stress disorder in humans.87 Sometimes captured wolves
are absent from their packs for a prolonged period,88 which can disrupt
their socialization.89
immobilization for marking or tagging, can negatively impact species in a variety of ways.” Zoe
Jewell, quoted in Using—and Sharing—New Technologies is Key for Conservation, DUKE TODAY
(Oct. 5, 2015), www.today.duke.edu.
85. Don Jenkins, Capture Leads to Fatal Infection for Washington Wolf, CAPITAL PRESS
(May 10, 2016), http://www.capitalpress.com/Washington/20160510/capture-leads-to-fatal-infecti
on-for-washington-wolf (“The breeding female of southeastern Washington’s only wolfpack was
found dead of an infection five days after being captured and fitted with a transmitting collar . . .
The wolf, a member of the Tuconnan pack, likely picked up the infection from a wound she
received while being shot with a dart to immobilize her”); 2 Gray Wolves Die During Annual
Government Count, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.santafenewmexican.co
m/news/briefs/mexican-gray-wolves-die-during-annual-government-count/article_9684f143-e5fe517b-889d-04245dc145a9.html (reporting two deaths in an operation to capture and collar
Mexican gray wolves; one wolf died “within minutes of being darted,” and the other died four
days after release).
86. Margaret Guthrie, Wolf Whistle, SCIENTIST MAGAZINE (Dec. 1, 2009), www.thescientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/27813/title/Wolf-whistle/ (“Ed Bangs, of the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife service, who’s in charge of the interagency cooperation on managing the wolf population,
estimates that approximately 2 percent of the wolves trapped for radio collaring die from the
trauma.”); see Rehm-Westoff, supra note 80 (raising concerns about researchers’ reliance on
telemetry collars because “several wolves died during the collaring process.”).
87. Joslin, supra note 82, at 216 (“some preliminary data to suggest that wolves not only
remember what happens to them [during their capture for collaring], but are capable of suffering
from post-traumatic stress.”); Rehm-Westoff, supra note 80 (noting critics’ “concern for the
trauma, both emotionally and physically, that the collaring procedures inflict on the wolves.”);
Jay Mallonee & Paul Joslin, Traumatic Stress Disorder Observed in an Adult Wild Captive Wolf
(Canis Lupus), 7 J. APPLIED ANIMAL WELFARE SCIENCE 107 (2010) (observing that darting and
capture resulted in “symptoms that were similar to those of humans with posttraumatic stress
disorder.”); see generally Jewell, supra note 70, at 501 (describing “wide-ranging psychological
effects of acute and chronic stress” that animals suffer during capture; observing that the
“emergency literature on the immediate and longer-term effects of capture and handling
procedure indicate that it can no longer be assumed that a wild animal’s survival of the process
implies the safety of the procedure.”).
88. Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing the process of
capture and collaring, which can sometimes take a long time because wildlife officials move the
captured wolves to a central location before returning them to their packs).
89. See Jewell, supra note 70, at 505 (“Even apparently minor interference in the life of a
free-ranging animal can have serious negative effects . . . . [T]emporary removal of individuals
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The collars themselves can cause significant and ongoing harm to
wolves. The size of wolves’ necks may change as they age or their diet
varies. Collars that become too restrictive to cause edema or wounds.90
Even if the collars continue to fit, they can still harm the wolves by
providing a hiding place for ticks91 and a warm home for mange mites.92
The radio signals emitted by surveillance collars might also pose health
risks to wolves over time, although there is disagreement among
scientists concerning the extent of this hazard.93 Certain types of collars
are quite bulky relative to a wolf’s body weight, and this encumbrance
causes discomfort that can disrupt the wolf’s behavior.94 It is no wonder

from a population can cause social disruption and lead to permanent hierarchical changes,
particularly in social animals such as wolves.”) (internal citations omitted).
90. Zoe Jewell, a researcher affiliated with Duke University, made the following comment
on ResearchGate, an online community of researchers: “A collar that is comfortable on fitting
can quickly change fit with the condition of the animal and become too tight causing peripheral
oedema and/or wounding.” What is the Optimal Way of Putting a Collar Around an Animal’s
Neck?, RESEARCHGATE.NET (May 19, 2015), https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_is_the_op
timal_way_of_putting_a_collar_around_an_animals_neck.
91. The ethical guidelines for radio tracking in Australia note that, “[i]n areas where ticks
occur, care should be taken in using collars as they may prevent the animal from grooming
normally and removing the tick.” Radio Tracking Wildlife Research, ANIMAL ETHICS INFOLINK,
www.animalethics.org.au/policies-and-guideliens/widlife-research/radio-tracking (last visited
July 11, 2016) (indicating that “alternatives to collars should be used” in these areas). Cf.
Andrews, supra note 10 (indicating that surveillance collars inhibit howler monkeys’ grooming
and removal of small pests from their fur).
92. Nowhere to Hide. . .The Intrusive Collaring of Wolves, HOWLING FOR JUSTICE:
BLOGGING FOR THE GRAY WOLF (Nov. 14, 2010), https://howlingforjustice.wordpress.com/tag/s
arcoptic-mange/ (“Another adverse effect of collaring [wolves] is the dreaded mange mite. It
finds a warm home under their collars, which can torment wolves who are infested with the pest,
causing itching and distress, leading to further deterioration of their condition.”); Paul Cross,
Effects of Sarcoptic Mange on Gray Wolves in Yellowstone Park, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
www.usgs.gov/centers/norock/science/effects-sarcoptic-mange-gray-wolves-yellowstone-national
-park (last visited on July 12, 2016) (“Sarcoptic mange is a highly contagious canine skin
disease . . . which eventually lead to death.”); see also Paul Cross et al., Energetic Costs of Mange
in Wolves Estimated from Infrared Thermography, 97 ECOLOGY 1938 (2016) (explaining how
mange infection causes heat loss, reduce movement, and change predation by wolves because
they are losing energy so rapidly).
93. See Microwaves, Radio Waves, and Other Types of Radiofrequency Radiation,
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY (May 31, 2016), www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/
radiationexposureandcancer/radiofrequency-radiation (noting that International Agency for
Research on Cancer has identified RF exposure as a possible carcinogen, but observing that the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. National Toxicology Program have not yet
formally classified RF radiation as to its cancer-causing potential).
94. According to Jewell, “Even mild discomfort [attributable to a surveillance collar] can
distort behavior.” Jewell, supra note 90.
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that wolves try to chew off their collars and free themselves of this
menace.95
A different set of harms arises when wildlife managers use
surveillance collars to confine wolves within a particular area.
Genetically programmed to roam great distances as they pursue prey
or escape predation, wolves are nomadic by nature.96 Their territory
can extend for hundreds of miles.97 Surveillance collars provide a
means of controlling wolves’ movements98 and substantially reducing
their territory.99 Managers who monitor the collars’ transmissions can
track down and recapture wolves that have strayed too far. Some
collars even administer shocks100 or tranquilizers101 to prevent wolves
from leaving their approved areas.102 New York Times columnist John

95. Wolves near Idaho City Learn to Chew off Radio Collars, WOLF SAGA (July 27, 2006),
http://wolfsaga.blogspot.com/2006/07/wolves-near-idaho-city-learn-to-chew.html. (reporting that
wolves have “found a way to chew off their radio collars.”); see Andrews, supra note 10 (reporting
that howler monkeys also tried to extricate themselves from their surveillance collars).
96. According to David Mech, a senior research scientist employed by the U.S. Geological
Survey, “wolves are nomadic for about half the year, after their pups have grown and developed
enough to move with them . . . Wolves are capable and inveterate travelers . . . Packs can travel
up to 56 km (35 miles) at night and 76 km (45 miles) by day.” DAVID MECH ET AL., WOLVES:
BEHAVIOR, ECOLOGY AND CONSERVATION 32 (2010).
97. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 34, at 432 (observing that wolves’ territory can extend up to
a thousand miles); Linda Maples, New Wolf Pack in Washington, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/wolf-pack/ (“Wolves are also legendary
travelers . . . . A year-and-a-half-old female traveled more than 3,00 miles in just six months.”);
Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Canid North of Grand Canyon Confirmed to be a
Rocky Mountain Gray Wolf (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.fws.gov/news/shownews.cfm?ref=can
id-north-of-grand-canyon-confirmed-to-be-a-rocky-mountain-gray-wolf&_ID=34770
(“The
DNA results indicate this wolf traveled at least 450 miles from an area in the northern Rocky
Mountains to northern Arizona.”).
98. TURNER, supra note 65, at 57 (“Unfortunately, collaring is also a means of control—a
cop collars a criminal; a farmer uses a collar to manage draft animals.”); Rinfret, supra note 65
(applying Foucauldian philosophy in analyzing government’s use of “tracking devices to monitor
and modify the movements” of wolves); see BRAVERMAN, supra note 37, at 13 (discussing “a
growing scholarship that extends the scope of biopolitics to the realm of governing nonhuman
animals.”).
99. See Jewell, supra note 70, at 505 (citing research indicating that animals with surveillance
collars have smaller ranges than animals with collars).
100. Andrews, supra note 10 (discussing use of shock collars on wild wolves: “When the
wolves tried to roam beyond a fence of senses controlled by satellite, they were shocked.”).
101. Doremus, supra note 9 (reporting that government fitted wolves “with ‘capture collars’
designed to deliver a sedative dose in response to a radio signal”). See INTERNATIONAL WOLF
CENTER, supra note 7 (“These special radio collars can also be equipped with darts holding a
tranquilizer, which can be triggered from a distance. This allows researchers to easily recapture
an animal.”).
102. Doremus, supra note 9, at 60.
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Mooellem refers to such a device as a “kill switch”103 because it
essentially shuts down the wolf, much like cutting the power to a
machine. Mark Phillips, a wildlife biologist who formerly worked with
collared wolves, expressed his dismay that he was essentially a
“zookeeper” in the wilderness.104 Professor Holly Doremus has gone
so far as to say that such restrictions on movement deprive wolves of
their wildness.105 Limitations on movement not only suppress wolves’
true nature but also impair their physical health by limiting their access
to prey and their ability to adapt to stressors by relocating to more
hospitable environments.106
Surveillance collars also increase wolves’ vulnerability to hunting.
Certain types of collars have bright colors, making the collared animals
more easily visible to hunters.107 Critics have suggested that hunters
can track the signals from telemetry collars, either because the hunters
can intercept the signals surreptitiously,108 or because the hunters gain
103. JON MOOALLEM, WILD ONES: A SOMETIMES DISMAYING, WEIRDLY REASSURING
STORY ABOUT LOOKING AT PEOPLE LOOKING AT ANIMALS IN AMERICA 262 (2013) (“When red
wolves were reintroduced in North Carolina, the animals were outfitted with special collars that
could be triggered remotely to stick the wolves in the neck with a sedative. It was a kind of a kill
switch, in case the humans who were monitoring the wolves saw an animal’s signal wander outside
the designated territory but couldn’t get on the ground quickly enough to intercept it.”);
BRAVERMAN, supra note 37, at 164 (when collared wolves move outside an “arbitrary zone,”
humans will “go and kill them, or capture them and put them back”).
104. Loder, supra note 1, at 127 (quoting Mike Phillips, a wildlife biologist whose duties
involved collaring and moving wolves as part of the reintroduction initiative: “What are we
doing? . . . I’m starting to feel like a damned zookeeper.”).
105. Doremus, supra note 9, at 61 (“These direct control measures erect a virtual cage around
the animals, converting them from wild creatures into semi-domesticated ones . . . .”); see
Doremus, supra note 3 (arguing that by confining animals in finite spaces, we are “giving up the
wildness of nature and the ability of species to pursue their own evolutionary destiny”).
106. Jewell has written that, “for free-ranging animals that need to predate and avoid
predation, any negative impact on movement could cause very significant reduction in fitness.”
Zoe Jewell, What is the Optimal Way of Putting a Collar Around an Animal’s Neck?, RESEARCH
GATE (May 25, 2015), www.researchgate.net/post/What_is_the_optimal_way_of_putting_a_coll
ar_around_an_animals_neck.
107. See Tariku Gutema, Wildlife Radio Telemetry: Use, Effect and Ethical Consideration with
Emphasis on Birds and Mammals, 24 INT’L J. SCIENCES: BASIC & APPLIED RESEARCH 306, 309
(2015) (observing that the mortality rate was higher for collared white-tailed deer than for their
uncollared counterparts; one possible explanation was that the collars “allowed hunters to more
easily see the deer”).
108. Declaration of James Peek, professional biologist and former professor of wildlife
management at University of Idaho, submitted to U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho,
Wolf Recovery Foundation vs. U.S. Forest Service, Jan. 22, 2010, available on WestLaw at 2010
WL 2150437 (“It is not hard for outfitters or other members of the public to get the signal
information from radio collars and therefore the locations of the wolves. This information would
make it much easier to locate the wolves and kill them . . . .”); see also Jeff Hull, Out of Bounds:
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access to signals when the government shares the frequencies with
ranchers.109 According to some reports, poachers who are able to
monitor the government’s telemetry have killed collared animals
within hours after the initial collaring.110 Sometimes government
officials are the ones who shoot the collared animals.111 The agencies
that spend millions to collar and protect wolves might abruptly decide
to slaughter them,112 and surveillance collars facilitate the efficient
The Death of 832F, Yellowstone’s Most Famous Wolf, OUTDOOR MAGAZINE, Feb. 13, 2013
(pointing out that after the shooting deaths of collared wolves at Yellowstone, commenters on a
hunting website claimed responsibility and “admitted that they would go after collared wolves”);
Jeffrey St. Clair, Sacrificial Wolves of Yellowstone, THE ECOLOGIST, Oct. 29, 2013 (“There is
compelling evidence that anti-wolf hunters in Wyoming had been honing in on the telemetry
frequencies from the radio collars to track and kill the wolves . . . .”).
109. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The USFWS also
provides the radio frequencies [for wolf collars] to local ranchers to alert them when wolf packs
are near.”); Matthew Weaver, Lawmakers Question Wolf Collar Data Blackout for Ranchers,
CAPITAL PRESS, May 6, 2016 (indicating that Washington wildlife officials share wolf tracking
data with ranchers except during denning season); Chris Roberts, New Mexico Ranchers’ Use of
Technology to Track Wolves Debated, EL PASO TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010 (revealing that U.S. Fish
and Wildlife officials have shared telemetry equipment and tracking frequencies with ranchers in
Arizona and New Mexico). But see George Plaven, Ranchers Want More Precise Wolf Locations
from GPS Collars, CAPITAL PRESS, Oct.. 13, 2014 (reporting frustration of Oregon ranchers when
the state’s fish and game officials only provided general information, not exact location of wolves).
110. Merritt Clifton, Field Mortalities in Wildlife Research: It’s Time for a Conversation, Aug.
13, 2014, www.animals24-7.org/field_mortalities_in_wildlife_ research#-V38E2DfW_AE (last
visited on July 7, 2016) (pointing to over 50 cases in which poachers have apparently intercepted
transmissions from radio-tagged animals, “often within days and sometimes within hours of the
radio tracking devices being attached to the animals.”).
111. Fischman, supra note 29 (discussing criticism that “radio-collaring wolf pups will enable
agents to more easily track and find wolves in order to kill enough of them to drive down Idaho’s
wolf population”); Jody Emel, Are You Man Enough, Big and Bad Enough? Ecofeminism and
Wolf Eradication in the USA., reprinted in ANIMAL GEOGRAPHIES: PLACE, POLITICS AND
IDENTITY IN THE NATURE-CULTURE BORDERLANDS 102 n. 47 (1988) (“Wolves are tranquilized
and collared with radio collars, then tracked by planes and shot down.”); e.g., Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, Montana Gray Wolf Conservation and Management
2015 Annual Report 14 (Mar. 26, 2016), http://fwp.mt.gov/fishandwildlife/management/wolf/ (last
visited on July 11, 2016) (noting that the population of collared wolves declined due in part to
state officials’ “control”); ODFW Kills Four NE Oregon Wolves after Five Livestock Attacks,
KTVZ.COM (Mar. 31 2016) http://www.ktvz.com/news/odfw-kills-four-ne-oregon-wolves-afterfive-livestock-attacks/69132996 (indicating that Oregon officials killed four wolves, two with
collars). See USDA Animal and Plant Health and Inspection Service, PROGRAM DATA REPORT
G-2015, https://www.aphis.usda.gov/wildlife_damage/pdr/PDR-G_Report.php?fy=2015&fld=&fl
d_val= (last visited on July 17, 2016) (stating that in 2015, federal officials killed 383 gray wolves).
112. Christopher Ketcham, Wolves to the Slaughter, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Mar. 13, 2016
(“After spending upward of $40 million studying the animals—then capturing, collaring, tracking,
and protecting them—the federal government last year scheduled wolves to be killed in huge
numbers . . . .”); Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar,
available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 6980674 *28 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (indicating that in Idaho,
“[s]ome of the wolves killed via aerial gunning by state agents are being tracked by radio collars
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extermination of the animals.113 Certain states such as Alaska and
Idaho have shown a particular zeal for killing wolves, including
collared wolves.114 The recent congressional amendment delisting the
gray wolf portends ominously for their future in these states.115
The use of surveillance collars on wolves is objectionable even
when this invasion of privacy does not result in physical harm to the
animals.116 The intrusion violates their autonomy and wildness.117
Numerous studies have shown that animals cherish their ability to hide
and conduct certain intimate affairs in private.118 While some
categories of professionals, such as documentary filmmakers, have
begun to value wild animals’ privacy for its own sake,119 wildlife
initially implemented for the purpose of scientific research”).
113. GRETTA NILLSON, ENDANGERED SPECIES HANDBOOK: VANISHING SPECIES 4 (2005)
(“Some hunters use the signals emitted by radio transmitters placed in wild animal collars by
biologists for tracking, to hone in and better pursue them to their deaths. . . These devices give
humans such an advantage that they render the natural protections animals have evolved over
eons completely ineffective”). E.g., KTVZ.com, supra note 116 (surveillance collars allowed
state’s hunters to kill wolves within hours after receiving authorization).
114. Roger Phillips, Idaho: radio collars are vital tool for game management, IDAHO DEPT.
FISH & GAME, Jan. 25, 2016 (discussing Idaho’s “use of radio collars to ensure targeted removal”
of wolves); Sean Cockerham, Collared Wolves Killed During Aerial Predator Control, ALASKA
NEWS, (Mar. 18, 2010) (“the Alaska Department of Fish and Game resumed killing wolves from
helicopters this week in the Interior and immediately sparked controversy by wiping out a pack
that included wolves collared for research . . . .”). See supra note 26–27 and accompanying text
(noting legislation to give states control over wolves).
115. Delisting would allow states to control management (including collaring) of most wolves
in the United States. See supra note 26–27 and accompanying text.
116. As noted previously, surveillance collars can result in concomitant privacy violations and
physical injuries. Keim, supra note 17.
117. See Doremus, supra note 3 (arguing that by collaring animals and limiting their ability to
engage in instinctive behaviors, we are “giving up the wildness of nature and the ability of species
to pursue their own evolutionary destiny”).
118. See, e.g., Henry F. Fradella, et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring “Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM L. 289, 301 (2011)
(“Although privacy is a concept that is often perceived as being a unique characteristic of human
beings, several decades of growing evidence suggest human and animals both share biological
needs for privacy.”). See JUDITH DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS AND THE RISE
OF TECHNOLOGY 12 (Cornell University Press 1997) (“[V]irtually all animals seek periods of
individual seclusion or small group intimacy,” and this inclination to be private serves “various
biological purposes, especially that of ensuring propagation of the species”); Peter Klopfer and
Daniel Rubenstein, The Concept of Privacy and Its Biological Bases, 33 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 52, 64
(1977) (“In sum, there are innumerable instances of nonhuman animals acting in a manner that
characterizes humans seeking privacy”).
119. Professor Brett Mills at the University of East Anglia has argued that filmmakers
shooting wildlife documentaries should respect the privacy of their nonhuman subjects.
“[P]rivacy as it is commonly understood it [sic] is a culturally human concept,” Mills
acknowledged. Brett Mills, Television Wildlife Documentaries and Animals’ Right to Privacy, 24
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biologists and managers have been surprisingly slow to acknowledge
the intrinsic importance of privacy in the wild.120 The use of
surveillance collars denies wolves any privacy altogether; an animal
wearing a surveillance collar is “never able to hide.”121 These collars
allow ubiquitous, incessant surveillance as if the wolves were inmates
in Bentham’s Panopticon.122 Some wildlife biologists appear more
interested in sustaining the lives of the animals they monitor (or at least
a minimal number within a species) than in preserving the behavioral
characteristics that are the essence of that species.123 The obsession
with preserving life is understandable given the vulnerability of many
species to extinction, but the gray wolf is not such a species,124 so the
preservation of its wildness merits higher priority.
Some might argue that surveillance does not jeopardize wildness
because animals do not understand that they are under surveillance.125

CONTINUUM: J. OF MEDIA & CULTURAL STUD. 193, 196 (2010). “We can never really know if
animals are giving consent but they often do engage in forms of behaviour which suggest they’d
rather not encounter humans, and we might want to think about equating this with a desire for
privacy.” Alessandro Torello, Do Animals Deserve Privacy, Too?, April 30, 2010, WALL ST. J.,
https://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2010/04/30/do-animals-deserve-privacy-too/ (quoting Mills).
120. To the contrary, the people who conduct surveillance of wildlife have shown an alarming
willingness to invade animals’ privacy and even showcase the animals on social media. See supra
note 66. There is nothing private about the life of an animal with a Facebook page that chronicles
all of that animal’s activities. “Knowing a wolf’s number and collar frequency are gateways to
knowing an astonishing amount of information about it, rather like knowing a person’s Social
Security number and computer passwords. A wolf without a number and collar is anonymous: no
control, no knowledge.” TURNER, supra note 65, at 58; Emily Anthes, Tracking the Pack, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2013 (observing that by using high-tech devices “to track free-ranging animals,
biologists are providing us with intimate access to the daily lives of other species”).
121. Animals in the modern “wired wilderness” are “never able to hide, never out of
surveillance.” Jacob Hamlin, Introduction, 3 H-ENV’T ROUNDTABLE REV. 2, (2013) (describing
modern surveillance of wilderness as “Orwellian” and comparing high-tech control of nature to
the scenario depicted in the movie The Hunger Games, with “‘wild’ inhabitants completely
manufactured at will by the game managers”).
122. Michael Lewis, Comments on Wired Wilderness: Technologies of Tracking and the
Making of Modern Wildlife, 3 H-ENV’T ROUNDTABLE REV. 11, (2013) (discussing the “greater
tolerance for radio tracking of animals,” and suggesting that, “[t]he panopticon is not just for
people anymore”).
123. This perspective is evident in some arguments for captive breeding of animals that are
on the verge of extinction. See the New York Times’ online colloquium, Does Captive Breeding
Distract from Conservation?, July 5, 2012, www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/07/05/doescaptive-breeding-distract-from-conservation.
124. There are over 10,000 gray wolves in the U.S. (including Alaska, where the species has
never been endangered), so the gray wolf is nowhere near the precipice of extinction. U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, Gray Wolf (Canis Lupus) Biologue, (Dec. 2011), https://www.fws.gov/
midwest/wolf/aboutwolves/biologue.htm.
125. Although both Benson and Coleman seem to value wildness, they do note that animals
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However, this fact does not excuse the violation of their privacy, any
more than a human subject’s ignorance of surveillance excuses the
violation of human privacy. To condition a privacy-based objection on
the subject’s full understanding of the surveillance technology at issue
would disqualify many humans from defending their privacy against
modern surveillance techniques. The Supreme Court has never
imposed such a requirement.126 In any event, it seems clear that wolves
do understand the hardships that result when they wear surveillance
collars127 (even if the wolves do not comprehend exactly how the collars
operate.) For instance, wolves know when they black out and wake
up with bulky objects fastened to their necks,128 when they cannot
roam beyond a confined area,129 and when ineluctable hunters shoot at
them from helicopters.130 The government’s surveillance of wolves is
hardly surreptitious. It is conspicuous and overbearing.
B. Other Harms
The use of surveillance collars on wolves may cause harm to entire
ecosystems. For example, one common objective of wildlife managers
is to limit wolves’ predation on elk, so that human hunters do not face
competition in pursuing their prey.131 Surveillance collars are quite
are unaware of the surveillance by wildlife researchers. Coleman, supra note 32, at 82 (observing
that a typical collared wolf is “clueless to his status as well-monitored subject”); Etienne Benson,
The Wired Wilderness: Technologies of Tracking and the Making of Modern Wildlife, 3 H-ENV’T
ROUNDTABLE REV. (2013) (acknowledging that “wild animals are unlikely to be aware that the
radiotags attached to them are mechanisms of surveillance”).
126. The Supreme Court has repeatedly vindicated human privacy rights despite the fact that
targets of then-novel surveillance techniques were completely unaware of the investigation and
the technology used in the surveillance. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–53 (1967) (ruling
that the government’s attachment of a surveillance device to the exterior of a phone booth—a
cutting-edge surveillance technique at the time—violated the target’s privacy rights); Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–41 (2001) (similar ruling for thermal imaging device); Jones v.
United States, 565 U.S. 400, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (similar ruling for a “bumper beeper,” or
GPS tracking device, secretly attached to defendant’s car without his consent).
127. See Benson, supra note 130 (while animals do not understand exactly how electronic
surveillance works, “[n]onetheless, systems of pervasive, continuous, invisible surveillance
transform the conditions and quality of their lives, just as they do those of numerous humans”).
128. Supra note 91 and accompanying text.
129. Supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
130. Keith Ridler, 20 Wolves Killed in Northern Idaho to Boost Elk Population, FLATHEAD
BEACON, Feb. 11, 2016 (indicating that Idaho agents shot 20 wolves from a helicopter); Sean
Cockerham, Collared Wolves Killed During Aerial Predator Control, ALASKA NEWS, Mar. 18,
2010 (“The Alaska Department of Fish and Game resumed killing wolves from helicopters this
week in the Interior and immediately sparked controversy by wiping out a pack that included
wolves collared for research . . . .”).
131. Ridler, supra note 130 (reporting that Idaho killed wolves to increase population of elk);
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effective in segregating wolf and elk populations,132 but this strategy
can lead to collateral consequences. When wolves are absent, the elk
population increases greatly.133 The growing numbers of elk can
devastate trees and other vegetation that elk eat.134 As a result, other
species that depend on this vegetation will diminish in number.135 The
reintroduction of wolves in Yellowstone appears to have brought down
the elk population and helped to restore balance to the ecosystem,
although some scientists have disputed whether wolves should be given
all of the credit for this development.136 Apart from their salutary effect
in reducing elk browsing of trees at Yellowstone, wolves have helped
the ecosystem by providing food for several species of scavengers.137 It
is naive to characterize the wolf as the “hero” of the Yellowstone
ecosystem,138 because the precise role of wolves in any ecosystem is
see Stephens, supra note 33 at 936 (“In a region where hunting is often engrained in the culture,
hunters classify wolves ‘land piranhas,’ fearing that they will devastate local game populations
and deprive them of prized animals such as elk”); Emel, supra note 111, at 102 (one purpose of
wolf eradication has been “to sustain big game animals so that human hunters could kill them”).
132. Collars allow wildlife managers to keep wolves in designated areas. Supra note 95–102
Collars also allow managers to determine which wolves are attacking elk. Johnson, supra note
63. Managers can then use the collars to track and kill the wolves quickly. See, e.g., Ridler, supra
note 130.
133. Scientists have found an inverse relationship between the size of the wolf population and
the size of the elk population at Yellowstone. The wolves either prey on or scare away elk. See
www.yellowstonepark.com/gray-wolves-impact-elk/ (last visited July 18, 2016).
134. William Ripple, et al., Trophic Cascades among Wolves, Elk and Aspen on Yellowstone
National Park’s Northern Range, 102 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 227, 232–33 (2001)
(discussing evidence that Yellowstone wolves helped to restore trees by killing or scaring elk that
were browsing on the trees).
135. Id. (explaining that influence of wolves extends to several trophic levels and benefits
other species that elk had adversely affected, e.g., by reducing their food supply or nesting areas);
William Ripple and Robert Beschta, Trophic Cascades in Yellowstone: The First Fifteen Years
after Wolf Reintroduction, 145 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 205, 211–13 (2011) (indicating that
presence of wolves in Yellowstone helped beavers and bison by limiting elk browsing).
136. Kristin Marshall, et al., Interactions Among Herbivory, Climate, Topography and Plant
Age Shape Riparian Willow Dynamics in Northern Yellowstone National Park, USA, 102 J.
ECOLOGY 667, 676–77 (2014) (discussing complex interrelationship of several variables, not just
wolves, as explanation for increased growth of willows and related effects at Yellowstone).
137. Christopher Wilmers and Wayne Getz, Gray Wolves as Climate Change Buffers in
Yellowstone, PLOS BIOLOGY, Mar. 15, 2005, www.journals.plos.org (last visited on July 18, 2016)
(observing that wolves can help scavengers by providing late-winter carrion); see generally
William Ripple, et al., Status and Ecological Effects of the World’s Largest Carnivores, 343
SCIENCE 151 (2014) (reviewing several studies providing evidence of “trophic cascades”
attributable to the size of large predator populations in various ecosystems).
138. According to Arthur Middleton, a postdoctoral fellow at the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, the characterization of wolves as the lynchpin of the Yellowstone
ecosystem is too facile. Arthur Middleton, Is the Wolf a Real American Hero?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 2014 (suggesting that prior earlier studies overlooked possible alternative explanations).
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difficult for scientists to determine,139 but this uncertainty is exactly why
scientists should be wary of using surveillance collars to manipulate
wolf populations.140
Does the collaring of wolves cause harm to humans? Collaring
may fan the flames of anti-wolf hysteria, which is dangerous to wolves
and humans alike. Some Americans harbor a “deep ancestral hostility
to wolves.”141 Those who feel this contempt may see surveillance
collars as a tool for subjugating the species—keeping wolves a safe
distance from humanity142—and ensuring that wolves are quickly
accessible as soon as the law permits a cull.143 According to Professor
Jody Emel at Clark University, “[w]ild animals, and particularly
predators like the wolf. . . have been targets for hatred, the same hatred
that launched armies and lynch mobs against human ‘others.’”144 Emel
has stressed the urgency of challenging prejudice against wolves:
[F]or many of us, wolves and wilderness are symbols of resistance.
These animals are metaphors for oppositional ways of thinking and
feeling. Passion for their survival results from not anesthetizing
oneself to the oppression of animals and its links to other forms and
sites of oppression. . . To leave unexamined the structures [of
prejudice] that teach us to slice off or repress empathy and to
distance ourselves from the “other,” invites oppression, brutality,
holocaust. . . The license to hate and aggress guaranteed by both
racism and speciesism is written in one paranoid and sadistic hand.145

Other authors have equated antipathy toward wolves with
mistreatment of various human groups.146 Man’s contempt for wolves

139. Marshall, supra note 136; Middleton, supra note 138.
140. Duane, supra note 13 (criticizing hubris of those who believe they can manipulate
environment as if they were merely removing and replacing bricks in a Lego structure).
141. Verlyn Klinkenborg, Science, Mythology, Hatred, and the Fate of the Gray Wolf, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009 (describing some Americans’ deep-seated, irrational hatred of wolves).
142. Supra notes 95–100.
143. In states like Idaho, wildlife managers seemed poised to slaughter collared wolves to the
extent that the federal rules allow them to do so. See supra note 25–27. Critics have argued that
these managers collar wolves in order to track and kill the animals. Supra note 107; infra n. 151.
144. Id. at 102.
145. Id. at 112.
146. See, e.g, TURNER, supra note 65, 60–61 (“Wolves were humiliated, mutilated, and
tortured, often with what can only be described as glee. The historical record suggests not defense
but sadism. There are inexplicable, irrational hatreds hidden in the human soul that are eternally
fresh, the blend of fear and ignorance we see in Rwanda, Bosnia, Palestine, and Kashmir. Wolves
suffer from the same blend of fear, hatred and ignorance”); see Thomas Kuhne, The Claims of
Community, in PETER HAYES, ED., HOW WAS IT POSSIBLE: A HOLOCAUST READER 129 (U.
Nebraska Press 2015) (“Germany was infected with a germ that causes its people to treat their
victims as if they were wolves”) (internal quotes omitted); see Aviva Cantor, The Club, The Yoke
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belies the reality that human nature can be every bit as vicious as lupine
nature.147 Ironically, the demonizing and attempted segregation of
wolves brings out in humans the very qualities that humans deplore in
wolves.
A related irony is that humans actually reduce their own privacy
vís-a-vís wolves when they show disrespect for wolves’ privacy.
Evidence indicates that the more humans intrude in the world of
wolves, the more habituated wolves become to human contact, and the
more likely wolves will venture into areas populated by humans.148
Thus, one of the primary arguments offered by the anti-wolf lobby in
favor of surveillance collars—that they can minimize wolves’ contact
with humans—may be fallacious. If extensive human contact with
collared wolves is necessary for installing and maintaining the

and the Leash: What We Can Learn from Patriarchy’s Treatment of Animals, quoted in CHARLES
PATTERSON, ETERNAL TREBLINKA: OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS AND THE HOLOCAUST 12
(Lantern 2002) (“Nowhere is patriarchy’s iron fist as naked as in the oppression of animals, which
serves as the model and training ground for all other forms of oppression”); MORTIMER ADLER,
THE DIFFERENCE OF MAN AND THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES 265 (Fordham U. Press 1993)
(“Why, then, should not groups of superior men be able to justify their enslavement, exploitation,
or even genocide of inferior human groups on factual and moral grounds on those we now rely
on to justify our treatment of the animals [that we classify] as dangerous predators?”) (brackets
added).
147. Professor Jon Coleman’s apt title for his 2008 book, VICIOUS: WOLVES AND MEN IN
AMERICA, conveys his thesis: this adjective describes not only the wolves inhabiting the North
American continent, but also the humans who hunted and trapped them. COLEMAN supra note
32 at 1–15 (exploring motives for human extirpation of wolves, and drawing certain parallels
between wolves and humans). In a similar vein, the noted historian William Cronon at the
University of Wisconsin has pointed out how wolves’ attributes reflect human attributes in many
ways. William Cronon, Foreword: A Strange Violent Intimacy, in BRETT WALKER, THE LOST
WOLVES OF JAPAN xi–xiv (U. Washington Press 2009).
148. See, e.g., Colette Drworiz, Banff National Park to Consider Restraints on Wildlife
Photography after Wolf Put Down, CALGARY HERALD, June 15, 2016 (reporting that in Banff
National Park, more frequent interaction between wolves and humans leads to “habituation” that
emboldens wolves to venture near human communities); see also Website of Washington
Department of Fish and Wildlife, Gray Wolf Conservation and Management, http://wdfw.wa.gov/
conservation/gray_wolf/humans_pets.html (last visited on July 18, 2016) (“Wolves can become
habituated to humans in areas where they regularly encounter humans”); see generally Diane
Boyd, Wolf Habituation as a Conservation Conundrum, companion website for PRINCIPLES OF
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY (Sinauer 2006), http://sites.sinauer.com/groom/article.php?id=24
(last visited on July 18, 2016) (indicating that “an increase in human-wolf interaction may result
in harm to humans”).
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surveillance equipment,149 as well as moving “problem” wolves,150 than
the collars may be compounding the problem of human-wolf conflicts
in the long term.
III. INADEQUACY OF CURRENT REGULATION
Given the potentially harmful effects of wolf surveillance listed
above, why hasn’t the government adopted uniform rules limiting the
use of surveillance collars? Part of the answer lies in the diffuse nature
of the current regulations for wildlife telemetry. There is a patchwork
of rules imposing varying restrictions depending on the location of the
surveillance and the affiliation of the personnel conducting the
surveillance. These quirks—combined with the willingness of some
state officials to flout existing rules—have created an environment in
which surveillance of wolves can occur with little accountability.
The regulations of federal agencies with jurisdiction over wolf
habitats contain rules governing wolf surveillance. For example, the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service and the U.S.
Forest Service have jurisdiction over vast areas that include the ranges
of several wolf packs.151 The Code of Federal Regulations authorizes
these agencies and their delegatees to use surveillance collars on
wolves,152 but provides scant guidance concerning the procedures for
149. Humans sometimes need to handle wolves extensively in the initial capture and collaring
process. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that the
process of capture and collaring can sometimes take a long time because wildlife officials move
the captured wolves to a central location before returning them to their packs). Then humans
periodically need to change the batteries and otherwise maintain the surveillance equipment.
Mech, supra note 60, at 8–9 (noting that retrapping may be necessary for replacement of batteries
or recollaring).
150. Mark Phillips, who had responsibility for collaring and managing a large number of
reintroduced wolves, indicated that he had to intervene so frequently that he felt his role was
analogous to that of a “zookeeper.” Loder supra note 104.
151. Wolves wear surveillance collars on land controlled by all three of these agencies. See,
e.g. Brief of Appellee United States in Wyoming v. Jiminez, 2004 WL 312771 *i (10th Cir. Dec.
6, 2004) (indicating that for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, “radio collaring of reintroduced
wolves is an essential component of wolf control under the Wolf Reintroduction Program”);
National Park Service, WOLF MONITORING 1986-2014 (2014) (“More than 400 wolves have been
captured and collared” in Denali National Park alone); WILLIAM RODGERS, ENVT. L. INDIAN
COUNTRY 1:27 (2016) (noting that on land controlled by the Forest Service in Idaho, “biologists
trap wolves and place radio collars around the animals’ necks”).
152. For example, the Department of Interior’s regulations allow surveillance collars as one
possible means of monitoring reintroduced wolves. 50 CFR §17.84(iii)(8) (“The reintroduced
wolves will be monitored during the life of the project, including by the use of radio telemetry”).
See Appellee’s brief filed with U.S. Supreme Court in Wyoming v. Jiminez on Oct. 6, 2006,
available on Westlaw at 2006 WL 2849234 *2 (noting the duty of federal officials to monitor
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assessing applications, reviewing ongoing operations, or sanctioning
unauthorized use. The paucity of procedural regulations is an
invitation for abuse. For example, in 2016, the U.S. Forest Service
permitted the Idaho Department of Fish and Game to land helicopters
in the Frank Church-River of No Return Wilderness in order to place
surveillance collars on elk.153 The states’ contractors not only collared
elk, but also wolves, plainly exceeding the Forest Service’s
authorization.154 When environmental groups sued in protest,155 state
officials insisted that the wolf collaring was inadvertent, but that they
would continue to monitor the improperly collared wolves anyway.156
This episode illustrates the limited effectiveness of federal regulations
in constraining the collaring of wolves.157
An additional set of rules may come into play when collaring
involves wolves covered by the Endangered Species Act (ESA).158 The
ESA and its regulations penalize the unauthorized “tak[ing]” of any
wolves, and indicating that the officials do so “primarily by fitting the wolves with radio collars”).
153. Court Rules That Forest Service Illegally Authorized Helicopter Intrusions in Premiere
Wilderness Area, Earthjustice (Jan. 19, 2017), http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2017/court-rulesthat-forest-service-illegally-authorized-helicopter-intrusions-in-premiere-wilderness-area.
154. Rocky Barker, Idaho Fish and Game Breaks Agreement, Uses Helicopter to Collar
Wolves in Wilderness, IDAHO STATESMAN, Jan. 13, 2016 (“An Idaho Department of Fish and
Game crew using a helicopter in the Frank Church-River of No Return Wilderness to attach radio
collars to elk broke an agreement with the U.S. Forest Service and collared four wolves”).
155. Earthjustice attorney Tim Preso accused the Idaho Fish and Game officials of collaring
the wolves as part of a long-term plan to exterminate them. “There is every reason to believe that
these new wolf collars will be used by a state trapper to locate wolves for the purpose of killing
them . . .” Tim Preso, Idaho Breaks Agreement Using Helicopter Drops to Collar Wolves in Frank
Church Wilderness, Jan. 13, 2016, on Earthjustice.org (last visited on July 8, 2016).
156. Rob Chaney, Idaho Fish and Game Will Keep Monitoring Wolves Improperly Collared
in Wilderness, DAILY MISSOULIAN, Jan. 21, 2016 (quoting IDFG spokesman Mike Keckler, who
said, “The only way to remove those collars would be to go back in with helicopters”). Idaho
officials’ hostility to wolves is no secret. The Idaho Legislature has declared that, “It is the policy
of the state of Idaho to use every option to assert state sovereignty and mitigate the impact of
gray wolves on residents of the state. . .” Quoted in WILLIAM RODGERS, ENVT. L. INDIAN
COUNTRY 1:27 (2016). The Idaho governor has called for killing most of the wolves in the state’s
boundaries, and he said that “I’m prepared to bid for that first ticket to shoot a wolf myself.” Jim
Robbins, For Wolves, A Recovery May Not Be the Blessing It Seems, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007
(reporting governor’s plan to reduce wolf population from 650 to 100).
157. See Eric Barker, Fish and Game Taken to Task Over Wilderness Copter Flights,
LEWISTON TRIBUNE, Jan. 21, 2016 (indicating that Forest Service documented the
noncompliance of Idaho officials without taking enforcement action); but see Babcock, infra n.
283 (discussion intervention of federal court after environmentalists sued).
158. In some parts of the U.S., such as Alaska, wolves are not subject to the ESA. Lance
Richardson, Wolves May Be Losing a Nasty Political Battle, SLATE, Feb. 21, 2014, http://
www.slate.com/blogs/wild_things/2014/02/21/gray_wolf_endangered_species_act_conflict_should
_fish_and_wildlife_service.html
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endangered species,159 which applies to capturing or otherwise harming
such a species.160 As noted previously, the collaring of wolves often
entails capture and other harms,161 so the technique could arguably
violate the ESA.162 Regulations under the ESA establish a procedure
through which federal agencies may obtain permits to place
surveillance collars on endangered or threatened species.163 The
regulations include a short list of evaluative criteria, but are very
general and omit any mention of privacy.164 The regulations allow the
routine collaring of gray wolves because they have a “non-essential”
status under the ESA,165 and therefore are not subject to the strictest
protections.166 In general, the applicability of the ESA depends on
political considerations. The unpopularity of wolves makes them
vulnerable to “delisting” (i.e., exemption from certain protections
under the ESA).167 For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service decided
159. See generally, Paul Boudreaux, Understanding “Take” in the Endangered Species Act, 34
AZ. ST. L. J. 733, 735-41 (2004) (explaining ESA and “take” provisions in detail).
160. The term “take” means “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,
or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. §1532(19).
161. Zoe Jewell, a researcher at Duke’s Nicholas School of the Environment, has noted that
“invasive techniques, relying on capture and immobilization for marking or tagging, can
negatively impact species in a variety of ways.” Zoe Jewell, quoted in Using—and Sharing—New
Technologies Is Key for Conservation, DUKE TODAY, Oct. 5, 2015, https://today.duke.edu/2015/
10/pimm-consv-tech-release-sh-kl (last visited on July 9, 2016) (advocating that researchers
instead rely on non-invasive techniques such as footprint analysis).
162. Jewell made the following comment on ResearchGate, an online community of
researchers: “ I agree surgery is certainly not an option for an endangered species.” Has Anyone
Ever Tried to Attach a Radio Transmitter on a Fossorial Species?, www.researchgate.net, Feb. 14,
2015 (last visited on July 9, 2016).
163. See 50 CFR §17.22 (establishing procedural requirements for endangered species); 50
CFR §17.32 (establishing a procedure for threatened species).
164. E.g. 50 CFR §17.22(a)(2) (brief listing criteria used in reviewing applications to obtain
permits for scientific purposes or for the enhancement of propagation or survival)
165. Williams, supra note 35 (explaining that Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt sought the
ESA’s classification of “non-essential experimental population” for transplanted wolves because
“without such a designation, wolf recovery was impossible”).
166. 50 CFR §17.84(iii)(8) (allowing use of surveillance collars to monitor reintroduced
wolves); Brief of Appellee United States in Wyoming v. Jiminez, filed on Dec. 6, 2014 (“Federal
regulations implementing the ESA require the monitoring of reintroduced wolves, and the
regulations specify radio collaring as an appropriate monitoring method”).
167. The politicization of the delisting process under the ESA is the subject of extensive
scholarship. E.g., Hope Babcock, The Sad Story of the Northern Rocky Mountain Gray Wolf
Reintroduction Program, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 25, 50 n. 106 (2013) (suggesting that “the
majority party determines the recovered status of an endangered species purely in response to
political pressure”); Crystal Anderson, Reconsidering a Weakened Regulation: A Critical Analysis
of Delisting in the Endangered Species Act, 9 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 207 (2013) (contending that
Congress undermined the ESA for reasons of political expediency).
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to delist gray wolves in Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, among other
areas because of pressure from Congress.168 Ironically, under the ESA,
an agency might spend millions of dollars collaring and protecting
wolves, only to abruptly switch to authorizing the slaughter of the same
wolves once they lose their protected status.169
The Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”) also potentially governs the
use of surveillance collars on wolves. Passed primarily to protect the
welfare of animals in laboratory testing,170 this statute also includes
provisions that could apply to wildlife in field research. For example,
researchers are supervised by institutional animal care and use
committees (“IACUCs”) that review protocols to ensure animal
cruelty is not excessive.171 However, the AWA’s procedures have not
been effective in limiting the use of surveillance collars on wolves for
numerous reasons. First, and most fundamentally, the AWA protects
against excessive infliction of physical pain, but does not purport to
protect privacy.172 By allowing prolonged experimentation on animals
in laboratories, the AWA sets a very low bar for impermissible
constraints on animals’ freedom. Second, the AWA regulations are
highly permissive for any research classified as a “field study,”173 and
168. Somerset Perry, The Gray Wolf Delisting Rider and State Management Under the
Endangered Species Act, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 439, 441 (2012) (“Politicians in Idaho, Montana and
Wyoming repeatedly called for gray wolf delisting”). Pressured by Congress, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife acceded to these demands, but environmental groups filed lawsuits that led to partial
modification of the delisting. See generally Martha Williams, Lessons from the Wolf Wars:
Recovery vs. Delisting Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 106, 13146 (2015) (discussing delisting in Wyoming and Western Great Lakes region). President Trump’s
nominee for secretary of the interior, Ryan Zinke, has “consistently supported harmful, antiwildlife legislation that would severely undermine the Endangered Species Act and remove or
block protections for hundreds of imperiled species, including gray wolves . . .” Timothy Cama,
Trump Picks GOP Rep. Zinke for Interior Secretary, THE HILL, Dec. 15, 2016 (quoting Jamie
Rappaport, president of Defenders of Wildlife).
169. Ketcham, supra note 112 (“After spending upward of $40 million studying the animals—
then capturing, collaring, tracking, and protecting them—the federal government last year
scheduled wolves to be killed in huge numbers.”)
170. Jonathan Lindzey, et al., A Unique Application to the IACUC for Studies of Wild Animals
in or from Natural Settings, 24 CONTEMPORARY TOPICS 33, 33-34 (2002) (noting that AWA
originally regulated the treatment of lab animals, and only later came to regulate treatment of
animals in field research, so the AWA procedures are not well suited for the latter context).
171. 9 CFR §2.31(d)(1) (“In order to approve proposed activities or proposed significant
changes in ongoing activities, the IACUC shall conduct a review of those components of the
activities related to the care and use of animals and determine that the proposed activities are in
accordance with this subchapter unless acceptable justification for a departure is presented”).
172. 9 CFR §1.1 (defining physical pain for purposes of AWA, and excluding brief pain caused
by procedures such as injections; definition makes no mention of psychological harm).
173. 9 CFR §2.31(d)(1) (exempting field studies from certain categories of IACUC review).
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animal telemetry generally falls into this category.174 Third, the AWA
does not call for follow-up review of any field research approved by an
IACUC, even field research considered too invasive to qualify as a
field study.175 Fourth, the AWA’s narrow scope does not cover enough
categories of professionals and activities to regulate all use of
surveillance collars on wolves.176 Finally, some researchers subject to
the AWA may resent their accountability to IACUCs, which could
hinder the IACUC’s effectiveness in supervising wildlife
surveillance.177 For the foregoing reasons, “compliance with the
Jon Geller, director of the Veterinary Emergency and Rehabilitation Hospital in Fort Collins,
Colorado, and former member of an IACUC in the National Park Service, has criticized the
AWA’s permissive treatment of field studies, which “gain summary IACUC approval because
they presumptively do not cause pain or distress, or significantly alter the behavior of the animals
being studied, and are intended to be mostly observational in nature.” According to Geller, “field
studies may not be as benign as depicted.” Jon Geller, Field Mortalities in Wildlife Research: It’s
Time for a Conversation, posted on the website of the Humane Society Veterinary Medical
Association, July 21, 2014, available at www.havsma.org/field_mortalities_in_wildlife_research#
-V38E2DfW_AE (last visited on July 7, 2016). A group of mammalogists headed by Professor
Robert Sikes at the University of Arkansas-Little Rock has noted that the AWA’s definitions
distinguishing “field studies” from other categories of research are ambiguous, and as a result,
“[c]onsiderable misunderstanding has surrounded the application of the AWA to field studies.”
Robert Sikes, et al., Guidelines of the American Society of Mammalogists for the Use of Wild
Mammals in Research, 97 J. MAMMALOGY 663, 670 (2016).
174. According to the regulations adopted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture under the
AWA, “[f]ield study means any study done on free-living wild animals in their natural habitat,
which does not involve an invasive procedure, and which does not harm or materially alter the
behavior of the animals under study.” 9 CFR §1.1.; see, e.g.,University of Maryland Center for
Environmental Science, Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) Field Studies,
Oct. 21, 2011, www.UMCES.org (last visited on July 8, 2016) (explaining that animal telemetry
falls under the definition of field study unless surgery is necessary); University of Houston
Guidelines for Field Research, www.uh.edu/ (last visited on July 8, 2016) (same); Sikes, supra
note 173, at 670 (indicating that most categories of wildlife observation involving capture at outset
will still qualify as field studies under USDA regulations pursuant to AWA).
175. Geller, supra note 173 (“Principal investigators for government-funded field research
projects must submit proposed studies to the appropriate Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee, or IACUC, to ensure compliance with the Animal Welfare Act. Unfortunately,
unlike institutional animal research, there is no protocol for inspection or follow up, often leading
to unfortunate outcomes that may not be reported.”).
176. Tadlock Cowan, Congressional Research Service, The Animal Welfare Act: Background
and Selected Animal Welfare Legislation, 2, Jan. 5, 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22493
.pdf (last visited on July 8, 2016) (explaining that AWA covers dealers, exhibitors, animal transporters, research facilities, pet stores and organizers of events involving fights between animals).
177. Daniel Mulcahy, Does the Animal Welfare Act Apply to Free-Ranging Animals?, 44 INST.
LAB. ANIMAL RESOURCES J. 252, 255 (2003) (“Government researchers working with freeranging animals . . . may resent the intrusion of AWA-mandated review of their projects.
IACUC review has only recently been introduced to many federal and state agencies, and some
researchers view it as unwarranted criticism and an unnecessary additional burden on their
professional lives.”).
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[]AWA can be insufficient for government natural resource agencies
that use free-ranging animals in research and management studies.”178
Ethical guidelines might apply to the collaring of wolves for
surveillance, but these guidelines do little to protect wolves’ privacy.
Generally, there is far less authority on ethical boundaries for wildlife
research than that concerning ethical boundaries for research involving
humans.179 Some professional organizations whose members place
surveillance collars on wolves have ethical codes that regulate the
practice to varying degrees. Examples of such organizations include
the Wildlife Society,180 the Society for Conservation Biologists,181 the
American Society of Mammalogists,182 and the American
Psychological Society.183 However, for the most part the language in
178. Id. at 252.
179. See Zoe Jewell, Effect of Monitoring Technique on Quality of Conservation Science, 27
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 501, 502 (2013) (pointing out that far fewer articles on research ethics
appear in conservation and ecology journals than in medical journals).
180. THE WILDLIFE SOCIETY, CODE OF ETHICS, date of adoption unknown, available at
wildlife.org/governance/code-of-ethics/ (last accessed on July 6, 2016). The code does not address
animals’ privacy. Paragraph 4 of the Code urges members to “[e]xercise high standards in the
care and use of live vertebrate animals used for research, in accordance with accepted professional
guidelines for the respective classes of animals under study.”
181. THE SOCIETY FOR CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, CODE OF ETHICS, adopted in August
2004, available at www.combio.org/about-scb/who-we-are/code-of-ethics/ (last accessed on July
10, 2016). The Code includes general language about animal welfare but omits any mention of
privacy. Paragraph 15 of the Code exhorts members to “[a]dhere to the highest standards for
treatment of animals used in research in a way that contributes most positively to sustaining
natural populations and ecosystems”).
182. For its guidelines, the ASM has adopted a document authored by Robert Sikes, et al.,
Guidelines of the American Society of Mammalogists for the Use of Wild Mammals in Research,
97 J. MAMMALOGY 663 (2016). This document offers more detail than the other groups’
guidelines, and addresses such matters as trapping, tissue sampling, maintenance of wild-caught
mammals in captivity, and euthanasia, but the ASM guidelines still do not discuss privacy or any
related concept. One purpose of the ASM guidelines is to provide a protocol that an IACUC
might adopt. The ASM guidelines note that regulations under the AWA do not require IACUC
review for field studies—including studies that may involve capture at the outset—but some
agencies that provide grants to wildlife research might insist on IACUC oversight, so IACUC
review of such studies is inconsistent. Id. at 670. The ASM guidelines suggest that researchers
should seek IACUC review even when not required to do so. Id.
183. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR ETHICAL CONDUCT IN
THE CARE AND USE OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS IN RESEARCH, adopted by the APA Council of
Representatives on February 24, 2012, available at www.apa.org/science/leadership/care/guidelin
es.aspx (last visited on July 6, 2016). “Field research that carries a risk of materially altering the
behavior of nonhuman animals and/or producing damage to sensitive ecosystems is subject to
IACUC approval. Field research, if strictly observational, may not require animal care committee
approval . . . Psychologists conducting field research should disturb their populations as little as
possible, while acting consistent with the goals of research. Every effort should be made to
minimize potential harmful effects of the student on the population and on other plant and animal
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these guidelines is very general, and does not address the need to
protect the privacy of wildlife.184 Moreover, these professional
organizations do not have the means to enforce their ethical codes
effectively: they lack the power of licensure, and their strongest
sanction is censuring or suspending members, which does not prevent
the violators from engaging in further wildlife research.185 Some of
these organizations’ publications have set forth guidelines that could
be effective if widely adopted and enforced.186 However, for the most
part the role of professional organizations is to share information about
best practices rather than to compel compliance with protocols.
In sum, the present approach to regulating wolf surveillance is
inadequate in many respects. The rules that exist lack uniformity.
They leave large gaps in which wolf collaring can occur with little

species in the area.” (cross-referencing other regulation such as the AWA and the ESA.)
184. Only one of the codes listed here, the APA code, makes any reference to privacy, and
that reference concerns the privacy of humans who are near field research projects. “Research in
populated areas must be done with respect for the property and privacy or the inhabitants of the
area.” Id. While this sentence does not refer explicitly to humans, the context makes clear that
humans are the focus: because only humans own property. The codes of both the Wildlife Society
and the Society of Conservation Biologists provide that members should protect the rights of
humans (presumably including privacy), but the codes have no comparable language for animals.
WILDLIFE SOCIETY, CODE OF ETHICS, ¶5; SOCIETY OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGISTS, CODE OF
ETHICS, ¶14.
185. To put it differently, membership in these organizations is not a condition for
professionals to practice, as it is the case for state bar associations, which can suspend or disbar
members and thereby prevent them from practicing altogether (at least within a particular state).
Indeed, the organizations listed here accept members who are not even practitioners of
conservation science. See, e.g., WILDLIFE SOCIETY, www.wildlife.org/join/ (last visited on July
10, 2016) (“Membership is open to wildlife professionals, students and supporters who are
interested in wildlife science, management and conservation”); SOCIETY FOR CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY, www.combio.org/membership/become-a-member/ (last visited on July 10, 2016) (“The
Society For Conservation Biology has been advancing the science and practicing of conserving
the Earth’s biological diversity since 1985 and represents conservation professionals and students
worldwide . . . If you are working to prevent loss of biodiversity—no matter where you are in your
career or in the world—this is your professional community”); AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
MAMMALOGISTS, www.mammalsociety.org/ membership/ (last visited on July 10, 2016)
(“Anyone interested in mammalogy may become a member of the American Society of
Mammalogists upon payment of dues”).
186. For example, the ASM has published a set of guidelines that IACUCs could use in
reviewing proposals for research involving wildlife. Sikes, supra note 173, at 670. The ASM has
collaborated with the Ornithological Council to develop a template that researchers can use when
submitting such proposals to IACUCs. This form is accessible at http://ornithologyexchange.org/
articles/_/community/new-model-protocol-form-for-wildlife-research-now-available-r150.
As
noted previously, however, telemetry may qualify as a field study that is automatically exempt
from IACUC review, even though ASM urges its members to submit their protocols to IACUCs.
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regulation. To the extent that guidelines apply, they tend to be general
in nature, and do not mention animals’ privacy.
IV. TOWARD A CONCEPTION OF WILDLIFE PRIVACY
Neither the U.S. Constitution nor any statute recognizes an
animal’s legally enforceable privacy right.187 Animals have no rights at
all.188 The constitutional doctrine of privacy protects against
interference with a privately owned animal to the extent that the owner
asserts this right,189 but the animal has no claim to privacy independent
of the owner’s right,190 and even the derivative privacy right sometimes
yields to other priorities.191 In some jurisdictions, the law deems wild
animals to be the property of the government,192 so government
187. James Grimadli, National Zoo Cites Privacy Concerns in Its Refusal to Release Animal’s
Medical Records, WASH. POST, May 6, 2002, p. E3 (“The notion that animals have a right to
privacy is, from a legal standpoint odd, because courts have long held that they don’t”).
188. According to Hope Babcock of Georgetown, “The law is clear”: “animals have no legally
cognizable right.” Hope Babcock, A Brook with Legal Rights: The Rights of Nature in Court, 43
ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 39 (2016) (internal citations omitted). Accord Cara Feinberg, HARVARD
TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 2016 (animals are property and have no rights); Annie Dryden, Overcoming
the Inadequacies of Animal Cruelty Statutes and the Property-Based View of Animals, 38 IDAHO
L. REV. 177, 178 (2001) (“As property, animals logically lack ‘rights’”).
189. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Hurd, 743 N.E.2d 841, 844-45 (Mass. App. 2001) (in
prosecution for animal cruelty, defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy that protected
against government’s attempts to view condition of animal); see generally Jenni James, When Is
Rescue Necessary? Applying the Necessity Defense to the Rescue of Animals, 7 STAN. J. ANIMAL
L. 1, 33 (2014) (observing that “judges frequently find that the privacy interest of an animal
enterprise outweighs the right of an animal not to suffer,” so animal rights’ activists cannot invoke
necessity defense to overcome animal abusers’ reliance on trespass and privacy laws).
190. Humans tend to invoke privacy rights with respect to animals if the invocation of privacy
would benefit the humans. For example, the National Zoo denied the Washington Post access to
the medical records of a recently deceased giraffe, asserting that disclosure would violate the
animal’s privacy rights. Martin Halstuk Shielding Private Lives from Prying Eyes: The Escalating
Conflict between Constitutional Privacy and the Accountability Principle of Democracy, 11
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS. 71, 95 (2003); see James Grimadli, National Zoo Cites Privacy
Concerns in Its Refusal to Release Animal’s Medical Records, WASH. POST, May 6, 2002, E3 (“‘The
problem with standing is we have to assert human interests when it is the animal that has been
adversely affected,’ said the [Animal Defense Fund’s] managing attorney, Wendy Anderson”).
191. See, e.g., Martha Neil, City Wins Federal Civil Rights Case over Police Shooting of Dog
Attacked by Pit Bull, ABA J., June 13, 2015 (reporting that federal jury found for defendant when
plaintiff sued city alleging seizure in violation of Fourth Amendment privacy rights after
colorblind police officer shot and killed plaintiff’s dog; officer mistakenly thought was a pit bull
that posed a safety risk, and this earnest belief was sufficient to overcome plaintiff’s rights); see
also State v. Newcomb, ___ P.3d. —-, 2016 WL 3476247 *4-9 (Or. June 16, 2016) (rejecting
defendant’s claim that privacy right prohibited government from seizing and drawing blood from
defendant’s dog).
192. See, e.g., David Warner, Environmental Endgame: Destruction for Amusement and a
Sustainable Civilization, 9 S.C. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 56 (2000) (indicating that wild animals are property
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officials are free to control wildlife with virtually no legal constraints
whatsoever. The Supreme Court has declared that animals are the
paradigmatic example of creatures that may be photographed and
filmed without violating legally cognizable privacy interests.193
The current lack of constitutional rights for animals should not
discourage advocates from demanding protection of animals’ privacy.
Constitutional protections have been under-inclusive for most of this
country’s history. For example, the Constitution failed to protect the
rights of African-Americans until the 1860s194 and the equal rights of
women were not acknowledged until 1920.195 The Supreme Court did
not recognize the constitutional right of privacy until the 1960s,196 the
right of reproductive freedom until 1973,197 and a constitutional
protection for same-sex marriage until 2015.198 The gradual accretion
of rights in the U.S. offers some hope that the doctrine of privacy could
eventually extend to animals.
There are at least two conceivable strategies for reforming the law
to protect the privacy of wildlife. One would be a rights-based
approach recognizing animals as autonomous creatures entitled to
some version of dignity rights, including privacy.199 While the idea of
owned by the state); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724 (S.D. 1979) (“Wild animals in this
state are the property of the state”); Recent Case: Interstate Commerce—Control by States—
Prohibition of Exportation of Natural Gas, 25 HARV L. REV. 90, 90 (1911) (discussing “state’s
property right in wild animals”). According to David Favre, a law professor at Michigan State
and one of the nation’s top experts on animal law, “[t]he legal control of wildlife, as recognized
under the state ownership doctrine, is based on the fundamental premise that state government
has the power to control the taking (by capturing or killing) of all wild animals found within their
jurisdiction.” David Favre, Animal Wildlife Law—An Introduction,. ANIMAL LAW WEB
CENTER, 2003, available at www.animallaw.info/article/american-wildlife-law-introduction (last
accessed on July 5, 2016).
193. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S., 1, 5 n.2 (1978) (indicating that animals in a zoo may
be “filmed and photographed at will by the public or by media reporters”).
194. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery), amend. XIV (establishing equal
protection, among other provisions), and amend. XV (protecting voting rights).
195. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (allowing women to vote).
196. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a right of privacy that the
government violates when it criminalizes the use of contraception).
197. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a woman has a right to terminate her
pregnancy under certain circumstances).
198. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (determining that same-sex couples have
a constitutional right to marry just as if they were heterosexual couples).
199. Steven Wise is one of the foremost advocates for animal rights in the United States. He
is the president of the Nonhuman Rights Project. He grounds his argument for animal rights in a
Kantian conceptions of autonomy and dignity. See, e.g., Steven Wise, Hardly a Revolution—The
Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for Dignity-Rights in a Liberal Democracy, 22 VT. L. REV. 793,
861 (1998) (arguing that animals exhibit some of the attributes that Kant and others have deemed
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conferring some form of rights on nonhumans is appealing in theory,200
this approach has achieved little success to date,201 perhaps because it
appears to be a radical departure from the anthropocentric conception
of rights.
A second possible strategy would be to protect animals’ privacy as
a matter of policy, not as a matter of right.202 This strategy might be
viable if advocates could demonstrate that protecting animals’ privacy
is a modest and logical extension of current animal welfare statutes.203
This Article argues that this latter policy-based approach offers the
best avenue to establish a legal doctrine of wildlife privacy.
Furthermore, this Article also contends that protection of animals’
privacy is a natural corollary—or “penumbra”—of existing statutes.
A. Privacy as Integral to Animal Welfare
Federal and state law currently protect against abusive treatment
violating the bodily integrity of animals.204 The underlying rationale is
necessary for autonomy and personhood, so animals should be theoretically eligible for some
version of the dignity rights attendant to autonomy; while this article was not primarily about
privacy, it did incidentally mention privacy among other dignity rights).
200. For an excellent recent discussion of the case for extending rights to nonhumans, see
Babcock, supra note 188, at 3 (urging that a natural resource should be able to appear in court “in
its own right to complain of threats to its continued existence”); see also Christopher Stone,
Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S.C. L. REV. 450
(1972) (envisioning the possibility that trees could sue or intervene in suits).
201. Courts in the U.S. have generally rejected such arguments. Babcock, supra note 194, at
18 (arguing that nature “cannot gain access to the courts to protect itself”). In the U.S., no
constitutional provision at the federal or state level accords dignity rights to animals, but Germany
amended its constitution in 2012 to include such a provision. Emily Fitzgerald, [Ape]rsonshood,
34 REV. LITIG. 337, 351 (2015) (brackets in title of original).
202. Legislatures may deal with gaps in the coverage of the U.S. Constitution or state
constitutions by legislating rights and protections that exceed the constitutional minimums or
otherwise fill constitutional interstices. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation
after Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 291 (2006) (arguing that states should adopt statutes to fill gaps
in the coverage of the Sixth Amendment); Margaret Paris, Trust, Lies and Interrogation, 3 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 3, 8 (1996) (urging a legislative response to address gaps in the coverage of the
Fifth Amendment); David Schuman, Taking Rights Seriously: Communitarian Search and
Seizure, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 583, 603 (1990) (suggesting the same approach to deal with areas
beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment).
203. Judge Richard Posner has stressed the need for animal advocates to “proceed
incrementally, building on existing cases and legal concepts, toward [their] goal of radically
enhanced legal protections for animals.” Richard Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE L. J. 527, 528
(2000) (brackets added).
204. See id. at 539 (referring to federal statute addressing animal welfare as
“comprehensive”); see also Jeni James, When Is Rescue Necessary? Applying the Necessity
Defense to the Rescue of Animals, 7 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2014) (“Every state
prohibits animal cruelty to some extent, with provisions dating back to the 19th century”); Janet
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clear: it would be inhumane to allow the purposeful infliction of
suffering on animals.205 Animal cruelty laws generally prevent physical
mistreatment of nonhuman creatures where such mistreatment is
grossly disproportionate to the benefits humans derive from the
activity at issue.206 Specifically, laws exist to protect wild animals
against poaching,207 certain categories of scientific experimentation,208
mistreatment in activities that implicate interstate commerce.209 Other
laws safeguard the health of endangered species.210 While critics have
raised valid complaints about the limited scope of animal welfare

McDonald, Defending Those Who Cannot Speak: Civil and Criminal Prosecution of Animal
Abuse, 88-NOV FLA. BAR J. 30, 30 (2014) (“Animal cruelty, neglect, and abandonment laws are
codified in every state”). For a complete list of laws regulating cruelty to animals, see the website
of the Michigan State University College of Law’s Animal Legal and Historical Center,
www.animallaw.info/site/comparative-tables (last visted on July 5, 2016).
205. See United States v. Stevens, 599 U.S. 460, 495–96 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (declaring
that the government “has a compelling interest in preventing the torture depicted in crush
videos”); cf. Posner, supra note 203, at 534 (suggesting that, within a utilitarian framework that
posits a moral duty to maximize happiness, “it seems axiomatic that people should be forbidden
to mistreat those animals that have a sufficiently developed nervous system to be able to
experience pain”).
206. Humane Soc’y v. Lyng, 633 F. Supp. 480, 486 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (“It has long been the
public policy of this country to avoid unnecessary cruelty to animals.”): Gary Francione, Animals,
Property and Legal Welfarism: ‘Unnecessary’ Suffering and the ‘Humane’ Treatment, 46 RUTGERS
L. REV. 721, 723 (1994) (“There are, of course, many laws on the federal and state levels that
purport to protect animals from ‘inhumane’ treatment, but these laws do not really confer rights
in the sense that we usually use that term. Rather, these laws concern animal welfare, or the notion
that animals may be exploited by humans as long as the exploitation does not result in the
infliction of ‘unnecessary’ pain, suffering, or death.”).
207. See, e.g., Ruth Musgrave et al., The Status of Poaching in the United States—Are We
Protecting Our Wildlife, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 977, 985–1002 (1993) (reviewing federal and state
laws that restrict poaching); Christine Fisher, Conspiring to Violate the Lacey Act, 32 ENVT’L L.
475, 485–500 (2002) (explaining the provisions of the Lacey Act, which criminalizes trafficking in
certain categories of wildlife).
208. See Fitzgerald, supra note 207 (summarizing many different nations’ laws concerning
animal testing, and concluding that “banning the use of non-human animals in scientific testing
and invasive experimentation has become the norm”).
209. See Posner, supra note 203, at 539 (“The Animal Welfare Act provides comprehensive
federal protection of wild animals.”); but see Carole Nowiicki, The Animal Welfare Act: All Bark
and No Bite, 23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 443, 477 (1999) (expressing concern that “the AWA only
regulates research facilities, exhibitors, and dealers of animals in interstate commerce”).
210. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012) (declaring that a congressional purpose in passing the
Endangered Species Act was to protect endangered species from harm).
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statutes,211 it is undeniable that the law now offers some protection for
the physical integrity of animals.
Once one accepts the premise that the law should protect animals’
corporeal integrity, it is a small additional step to support the
protection of animals’ privacy. Animals need privacy to thrive.212 Alan
Westin, a professor at Columbia, summarized the scientific evidence
concerning the value of privacy to animals:
One basic finding of animal studies is that virtually all animals seek
periods of individual seclusion or small-group intimacy. This is
usually described as the tendency toward territoriality, in which an
organism lays private claim to an area of land, water, or air and
defends it against intrusion by members of its own species.213

Adam Moore of the University of Washington indicated privacy may
be a matter of life and death in the animal kingdom:
To get a sense of the importance of privacy and separation, it is
helpful to consider similar interests shared by many non-human
animals . . . . [E]cological studies demonstrat[e] that a lack of private
space, due to overpopulation and the like, will threaten survival. In
such conditions, animals may kill each other or engage in suicidal
reductions of their population . . . Moreover, these results hold
across a wide range of species, supporting the connection that having
the ability to separate, like food and water, is a necessity of life.214

According to Professor Westin, “[t]here have to be moments ‘offstage.’” Westin recognized that, “[t]o be ‘on’ always would destroy the
organism.”215

211. See, e.g., James, supra note 210, at 3 (“Actual [animal] protection, however, exists more
in theory than in practice. Anti-cruelty laws are often limited in scope, and protection varies
according to an animal’s species and economic utility.”); Darian M. Ibrahim, The Anticruelty
Statute: A Student in Animal Welfare, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 175, 176 (2006) (contending that
anticruelty statutes “do not challenge the majority of modern practices that exploit animals”).
212. Henry F. Fradellla et al., Quanitfying Katz: Empirically Measuring “Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 301 (2011) (“Although
privacy is a concept that is often perceived as being a unique characteristic of human beings,
several decades of growing evidence suggest human and animals both share biological needs for
privacy”). Animals find privacy to be beneficial even though they do not value it for the same
reason reasons that humans do. For an excellent discussion of the reasons why privacy is valuable
to humans, see Julie Cohen, What Is Privacy For?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905–1911 (2013).
213. ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 8 (Atheneum 1967); see Peter Klopfer &
Daniel Robenstein, The Concept of Privacy and Its Biological Bases, 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 52, 64
(1977) (“In sum, there are innumerable instances of nonhuman animals acting in a manner that
characterizes humans seeking privacy.”).
214. ADAM MOORE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: MORAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 47-48 (Penn St.
U. Press 2010) (internal citations omitted).
215. WESTIN, supra note 219, at 35.
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The necessity of privacy for survival is even clearer when
considering the full range of animals’ activities requiring some degree
of privacy. Mating usually occurs in private.216 Child rearing is also
highly private,217 as some animals will abandon their young altogether
in response to intrusion.218 Animals build or find secluded residences—
sometimes permanent, sometimes temporary—because they have a
physiological need to rest periodically without disturbance.219 Injured
animals need solitude in order to recuperate.220 Many animals pursue
prey stealthily, needing privacy to hunt.221 These are but some of the
reasons demonstrating why privacy is a basic necessity for virtually all
animals, many of whom “will die without it.”222

216. JUDITH DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS AND THE RISE OF
TECHNOLOGY 12 (Cornell U. Press 1997) (stating that “virtually all animals seek periods of
individual seclusion or small group intimacy,” and this inclination toward privacy serves “various
biological purposes, especially those of ensuring propagation of the species”).
217. Alan Westin, The Origins of Modern Claims to Property, in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 56, 57–58 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., Cambridge U. Press 1984)
(indicating that a lack of privacy can disrupt nest building and rearing of young); WILLIAM
HORNADAY, OUR VANISHING WILD LIFE: ITS EXTERMINATION AND PRESERVATION 322
(Scribner 1913) (“Every breeding wild animal craves seclusion and immunity from excitement
and all forms of molestation. Nature demands this as her unassailable right.”).
218. E.g., Robyn Boyd, Fact or Fiction? Birds (and Other Critters) Abandon Their Young at
the Slightest Human Touch, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (July 26, 2007), https://www.scientificamerica
n.com/article/fact-or-fiction-birds-abandon-young-at-human-touch/ (noting that birds may abandon their nests in response to human disturbance, although this abandonment may only be
temporary; rabbits may abandon their nests altogether).
219. Professor Brett Mills at the University of East Anglia stressed that documentary
filmmakers should not intrude in animals dens or burrows for this reason. UNIVERSITY OF EAST
ANGLIA, Animals’ Right to Privacy Denied by Wildlife Documentary Makers, Academic Says,
SCIENCE DAILY (Apr. 29, 2010), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/04/100429092934
.htm (“For example, many species could be read as desiring not to be seen—animals in burrows
and nests have constructed a living space which equates with the human concept of a home, and
commonly do this in locations which are, by their very nature, explicitly hidden, often for practical
purposes.”).
220. Wildlife experts recognize that privacy is crucial for healing. E.g., SAFEWINGS BIRD
SANCTUARY, About Us, UK SAFARI, www.uksafari.com/safewings/aboutus.htm (last visited on
July 20, 2016) (mentioning that healing from injury requires privacy from human intrusion);
HORNADAY, supra note 223, at 322 (arguing that when an animal “is struggling to recuperate, it
deserves to be left entirely unmolested”) (emphasis in original).
221. Ella Davies, Which Animal is the Stealthiest Hunter on the Planet?, BBC.COM (Dec. 22,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20151222-which-animal-is-the-deadliest-hunter-on-the-pl
anet (observing that some animals are stealthy hunters and “rely on the element of surprise to
catch their prey”).
222. Lenore Garon, Protecting Privacy in Credit Reporting, 24 STAN. L. REV. 550, 554 (1972)
(discussing basic biological necessity for privacy among many species of animals).
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B. Privacy as Legally Cognizable Penumbra
The law should protect animals’ privacy from human
encroachment because privacy implicates the same concerns as those
underlying the statutes protecting animals’ health. In other words,
protecting animals’ privacy is a penumbral implication of the current
laws protecting animals’ welfare and bodily integrity.223 In the legal
context, the term penumbral refers to an emanation from a plain
provision in existing law. The basic concept is that a penumbral
implication is so intertwined with other more straightforward
provisions that it ought to be enforceable alongside those provisions.224
Using penumbral analysis to infer a legal basis for wildlife privacy
seems sensible because human privacy also derives from a penumbra.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,225 the Supreme Court discerned a human
right to privacy even though the Constitution does not expressly
mention privacy.226 The Court in Griswold found that privacy is a
penumbra of other rights expressly set forth in the Constitution.227
According to the Court, specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that give
them life and substance. The Court relied on this penumbra to strike
down a state statute that criminalized the use of contraception.228 The

223. The word penumbra means “partially shaded outer region of the shadow cast by an
opaque object.” This definition of penumbra appears in the online version of the Oxford English
Dictionary, www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/penumbra (last visited
on July 20, 2016).
224. See Benjamin Zipursky, Practical Positivism Versus Practical Perfectionism: The HartFuller Debate at Fifty, 839 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1170, 1176 (2008) (noting that penumbral analysis
entails considering “the goals of the law” as evident in the language used in the law).
225. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
226. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (“The Constitution does not explicitly mention
any right of privacy.”). See SONU BEDI, REJECTING RIGHTS 146–47 (Cambridge Press 2009)
(indicating that “the modern right to privacy has little textual basis in the Constitution”).
227. 381 U.S. at 484. The constitutional guarantees giving rise to the penumbra of privacy
included the following: the First Amendment’s provisions guaranteeing freedom of association;
the Third Amendment’s protection against quartering of soldiers; the Fourth Amendment’s
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures; and the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition of
compulsory self-incrimination. Id.
228. Id. at 485.
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Court later embraced penumbral reasoning in a series of other cases
regarding privacy,229 including Roe v. Wade.230
While penumbral reasoning is most prominently invoked in the
context of constitutional jurisprudence,231 it also applies to statutory
interpretation.232 Even H.L.A. Hart, the famous advocate of legal
positivism,233 argued that penumbral analysis of statutes is appropriate
in certain circumstances.234 Hart wrote that a court should faithfully
apply the “core of settled meaning” in a statute, but should also apply
the principles underlying the statute to adjudicate the “penumbra of
debatable cases.”235 For example, a statute forbidding vehicles in a
park would logically extend to prohibit bicycles, roller skates and toy
cars in that park.236 Extension of the statute to cover additional matters
229. Spears, supra note 19 (noting that Griswold brought the term “penumbra” into the
national lexicon, “and since its issuance has served as an important basis on which other significant
privacy rulings have relied”); see BEDI, supra note 226, at 148, 156 (discussing role of Griswold’s
privacy right in later cases permitting abortion and consensual homosexual relations).
230. 410 U.S. at 152. There is some irony in attempting to derive a doctrine of wildlife privacy
from the penumbral reasoning that protects human reproductive freedom. The pro-life
movement and the animal rights movement are arguably similar in that they seek to extend rights
beyond what current law considers to be the limits of the human realm. For a fascinating
discussion of this parallel, see SHERRY COLB & MICHAEL DORF, BEATING HEARTS: ABORTION
AND ANIMAL RIGHTS 2 (2016).
231. Brandon Denning & Glenn Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089,
1120 (1997) (noting increased use of penumbras in constitutional interpretation by liberal and
conservative justices); Glenn Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1333, 1120 (1992) (observing that right-wing jurists engage in penumbral interpretation even as
the right ostensibly advocates strict interpretation and reliance on original intent); but see Alex
Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1639, 1647 (1993)
(criticizing penumbral interpretation, and suggesting that results could be “perilous”).
232. “The concept of penumbra is commonly used in resolving questions of constitutional and
statutory interpretation.” Brief of Appellant Max C. Maloney at 30, Maloney v. Valley Medical
Authorities, 946 A.2d 702 (Pa. Super Ct. 2007) (No. 346 WDA 2007) (emphasis added). See, e.g.,
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (“Other problems will lie in the
penumbra of express statutory mandate. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be
solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that
policy.”).
233. In a nutshell, positivists believe that interpretation of law should depend on the law itself,
not on extrinsic concepts of morality or “natural law.” Zipursky, supra note 231.
234. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 77 HARV. L. REV.
593, 607 (1958).
235. Id.
236. Anthony D’Amato has explained Hart’s example involving the statute forbidding
vehicles.
Each statute, according to Hart, has a core and a penumbra, and thus his theory is a
general one. In line with his positivist predecessors, Hart considers the court’s ability to
transform the penumbral part of the message as authorized by delegation from the
legislature. In other words, when a legislature passes a statute, it is saying to the court:
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not explicitly mentioned is necessary to achieve the underlying goals of
the statute.
In a similar manner, protecting animals’ privacy is essential to
achieve the goals underlying animal welfare statutes. As noted
previously, privacy is vital for animals’ health because it provides
opportunities for hunting, mating, rearing offspring, resting, and
recuperating from injury.237 Just as a statute prohibiting disruption in
a park should logically extend beyond vehicles to other vehicle-like
equipment, so too should a legislative scheme protecting animal
welfare protect animals’ privacy, which is indispensable to their
welfare.
There are many ways in which practical rules could express the
doctrine of animal privacy. The most straightforward approach would
be for legislatures to amend their animal welfare statutes in order to
protect privacy. Courts could also employ penumbral reasoning to
derive privacy protections from the more general language in current
animal welfare statutes. As Judge Posner has noted, the cause of
animal protection would benefit from characterizing its objectives as
closely related to objectives that judges and lawmakers already
consider legitimate.238 The importance of privacy (at least for humans)
is one of the few principles on which virtually all legislators and judges
agree.239 Protecting privacy with procedural rules limiting government
transmit the core portion of this message intact, but you are hereby delegated to
‘legislate’ or otherwise be creative (i.e., add information) with respect to the penumbral
portion of this message. [In the case of statute prohibiting vehicles in the park,] the term
‘vehicle’ might cast a wider net than simply encompassing the automobile. This Hart
calls the area of the ‘penumbra.’ The penumbra might include bicycles, roller skates,
toy automobiles that are battery propelled, or airplanes.
ANTHONY D’AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE: A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW
132–33 (1984) (brackets added).
237. See supra note 222–38 and accompanying text.
238. Judge Posner has suggested that animal advocates would be more likely to succeed if
“departures from existing law are treated as applications of it guided by analogy or deduction.”
Supra note 209 at 533. These advocates should not overlook “an approach to the question of
animal welfare that is more conservative, methodologically as well as politically, but possibly
more efficacious, than rights-mongering. That is simply to extend, and more vigorously enforce,
laws designed to prevent gratuitous cruelty to animals.” Id. at 539.
239. Jeffrey Rosen, a law professor at George Washington, has observed that, “conservative
and liberal justices have joined in unexpected alliances, proving that on the Supreme Court, as on
Capitol Hill, privacy is a cross-cutting, bipartisan issue.” Jeffrey Rosen, A Victory for Privacy,
WALL ST. J., June 18, 2001, at A.18. See also Craig Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth
Amendment, 84 INDIANA L. J. 1099, 1099 (2009) (noting that Republican appointees on the
Supreme Court have surprisingly similar to Democratic appointees in their zeal to protect privacy;
they have demanded warrants for even “minor intrusions” that infringe privacy rights); e.g., Joint
letter from Senator Chuck Grassley, chairman, and Patrick Leahy, ranking member, U.S. Senate
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intrusion is a familiar task for legislators and judges. They have already
formulated extensive rules to protect privacy in the context of criminal
investigations. The next Part considers the possibility of importing and
adapting some of these rules.
V. BORROWING REQUIREMENTS FOR INFRINGEMENT OF HUMAN
PRIVACY
Currently, a legal patchwork governs the surveillance of wildlife.240
This article argues that it is time to take animals’ privacy seriously by
establishing a uniform, comprehensive, and predictable set of rules for
the use of surveillance collars on wild animals. Such rules should
prescribe the procedure and limitations for monitoring wildlife, and
should set forth penalties for misuse of surveillance information.
The rules that protect human privacy during criminal
investigations provide a useful model. Of course, it would be
inappropriate to import the exact same rules to the context of wildlife
surveillance. No one would argue that the government should read
Miranda warnings to animals or seek their consent for searches.
However, the analogous example of criminal procedure deserves
careful consideration for several reasons. First, the surveillance
technology used in the wilderness derives from investigations of human
criminals and spies.241 Second, the rules of criminal investigation are
familiar not only to judges, lawyers, and police, but also throughout
popular culture. This familiarity might improve the likelihood of
compliance and the consistency of application. Third, the ample case
law addressing the fine points of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
could provide analogous—if not on-point—authority guiding the
implementation of rules for wildlife surveillance. Finally, the crossapplication of rules protecting human privacy may reduce speciesism
and increase humans’ appreciation for animals’ privacy.
The best way to safeguard wildlife privacy, like human privacy, is
Judiciary Comm., to Attorney Gen. Eric Holder (Jan. 22, 2015) (expressing bipartisan disapproval
of investigative tactics that infringed privacy).
240. See supra, Part III.
241. Benson, supra note 4 (recounting that wildlife biologists derived their surveillance
technology from investigations of crime and espionage). At the present time, wildlife biologists
are not only using this high-tech investigative techniques to learn about wildlife behavior, but also
to investigate possible crimes by humans against wildlife. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., About
the Laboratory, https://www.fws.gov/lab/about.php (last visited on July 22, 2016) (explaining that
lab uses advanced forensics technology to solve cases in which animals seem to be victims of
human crimes).
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with “bright-line rules.” These rules are predictable and help officials
readily discern all the boundaries limiting their conduct.242 Because
bright-line rules are necessary to protect privacy, penumbral analysis
does not usually play a significant role in enforcing the privacy rules on
a day-to-day basis. In other words, it is not necessary to cite the
underlying rationale for a bright-line rule and then argue why a
particular application of the rule would serve that rationale.243 For
example, a ban on contraception violates human privacy whether or
not the claimant has experienced the same sort of harm that led to
passage of the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech, the Third
Amendment’s prohibition of quartering soldiers, the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches, or the Fifth
Amendment’s right against self-incrimination, even though the right of
privacy emanates as a penumbra from these four constitutional
provisions.244 So too must the doctrine of animal privacy have a life of
its own, free of any requirement that violations must be linked to the
health concerns giving rise to the penumbra. Protection of wildlife
privacy must be intrinsically important. Health concerns may be the
original rationale for the penumbra, but they do not set the limits of
animal privacy. If application of the doctrine depended on proof of
health risks in each instance, the analysis would be too speculative and
the protection provided by the doctrine would be inconsistent. A
bright-line rule would not be very bright if its application were so
contingent.
242. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179–80
(1989) (arguing that bright-line rules are preferable because they improve predictability and
consistency).
243. Justice Scalia, who has been one of the strongest proponents of bright-line rules, has
expressed his disapproval of “reasoning that abstracts from the right to its purposes,” because
such reasoning could make the interpretation of a rule inconsistent, and could even undermine or
eliminate the right at issue. Scalia, J., dissenting, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990)
(criticizing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence under the Confrontation Clause for abstracting
from the confrontation right to its purposes, and then determining the right was unnecessary in a
particular case because it would not achieve the underlying purposes in that case). Scalia’s
majority opinion in Crawford v. Washington offered an illustration that showed the merit of this
argument: a judge should not assume that the right to a jury trial is instrumental to the goal of
discovering the truth, and then dispense with the defendant’s right to a jury trial when he seems
to be obviously guilty. 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004). Bright-line rules must be more secure and must be
immune to consequentialist analysis.
244. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (explaining how the right of privacy that led to invalidation of
Connecticut’s statute criminalizing contraception emerged as a penumbra from the first, third,
fourth and fifth amendments, but not requirement any showing that the ban on contraception
directly violated those four amendments or implicated the concerns that led to passage of those
amendments).
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine whether
statutes, regulations, or judicial rules would provide the best vehicle for
protection of animals’ privacy. A significant amount of scholarship has
already addressed the relative merits of these different approaches.245
Assuming uniform enforcement might be possible, the remainder of
this Part will focus on the substance of the proposed rules.
A. Balancing of Particularized Need vs. Privacy Interest
Criminal investigations generally may not infringe human privacy
without a showing that the infringement is reasonable.246 Absent a
categorical rule for investigations in particular settings such as airports
or prisons, reasonableness turns on a balancing of the government’s
particularized need for information against the privacy interest of the
suspect or class of suspects.247 This same balancing should be necessary
for the use of surveillance collars on wildlife. Specifically, a wildlife
biologist or manager should submit a written application setting forth
the rationale for the monitoring.248 The requirement of a written
submission imposes discipline on the applicant to take account of
competing interests, and creates a record for later reference if the
propriety of the surveillance is ever in doubt.249 The grounds for

245. David Steinberg, Sense-Enhanced Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth
Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465, 471–79 (2007) (comparing the institutional
competence of legislatures and courts to protect privacy against modern surveillance techniques);
Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Cause
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 857–82 (2004) (arguing the same).
246. Akil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 4 HARV. L. REV. 107 at 758 (explaining
that the Fourth Amendment requires that all searches and seizures be reasonable).
247. David Gray and Danielle Cintron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV.
62, 107 (2013) (“‘reasonableness’ requires balancing the legitimate interests of law enforcement
against the privacy interests of citizens”).
248. Institutional animal care and use committees (IACUCs) sometimes review applications
for surveillance, but the requirements for these applications are not sufficiently standardized, and
the use of surveillance collars does not always require review by IACUCs. See supra notes 168–
75.
249. John Taylor, Using Suppression Hearing Testimony to Prove Good Faith under United
States v. Leon, 54 KAN. L. REV. 155, 157 (2005) (contending that “the process of preparing a
warrant application also imposes on police officers the valuable discipline of having to sit down
and write out precisely why they believe they have probable cause to search”; suggesting further
that “the effort to justify a search to a neutral third party causes police to exercise greater care in
their probable cause judgments”); see Priscilla Smith, When Machines Are Watching: How
Warrantless Use of GPS Surveillance Technology Violations the Fourth Amendment Right against
Unreasonable Searches, 121 YALE L. J. FORUM, OCT. 11, 2011 (“Even if judges grant warrants for
GPS surveillance liberally, the requirement that law enforcement authorities justify each use of
surveillance prevents them from multiply this monitoring by millions.”).
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surveillance should include some discussion of benefits to the
particular animal that will wear the surveillance equipment, or in the
absence of such individual benefits, the significant collective benefits
that will accrue to the population of animals including the animal under
surveillance.250 The application should not rest entirely on the past
value of surveillance, because scientific research has cumulative
benefits, and scientists do not need to repeat past experiments to
validate their findings.251 The authority reviewing each application
should use what economists refer to as “marginal analysis”252 focusing
on whether surveillance of the next animal would bring benefits
exceeding the costs.
B. Consideration of Less Intrusive Alternatives
In criminal investigations, the government cannot use the most
intrusive types of investigative techniques, such as wiretaps, without
demonstrating that less intrusive strategies would be insufficient.253 A
similar requirement should apply to wildlife surveillance. Like a
wiretap, a surveillance collar is one of the most intrusive tools that the
government can use in an investigation: it gives investigators access to
a vast amount of intimate data on an ongoing basis.254 Thus, the
government should reserve this particular tool for circumstances in
which less intrusive tools are insufficient. In the case of wolf
surveillance, several other less intrusive techniques are available that
could avoid the need for a telemetry collar. These techniques include
analysis of scat255 and footprints,256 visual monitoring by wildlife
250. Joslin, supra note 83, at 216 (arguing that wildlife biologists should not capture and collar
animals “unless there is a reasonable expectation that the results will have some potential positive
benefit for the animals involved”).
251. See upra note 80 (raising doubts about incremental value of scientific data obtained from
surveillance collars); Lewis, supra note 127, at 9 (questioning the value of this data)
252. PAUL KRUGMAN, ET AL,, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 202 (Macmillan 2010) (defining
marginal analysis as consideration of incremental benefits and costs).
253. Stephen Arthur and Robert Hunter, Wiretapping Evidence, 1 FED. TRIAL HANDBOOK:
CRIMINAL § 29:3 (2015) (explaining that government may not use a wiretap unless other
investigative techniques would be inadequate).
254. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
255. Rebecca Kessler, Catch a Whiff? Device Aims to Reveal Age, Gender, and Identity of
Endangered Wolves from the Scent of Their Poop, ENVTL. NEWS, June 11, 2015 (discussing
technology that can identify individual wolves with 94% accuracy based on analysis of scat); e.g.,
John O’Connell, Biologist Changing the Way Wolves Are Tracked, CAPITAL PRESS, Dec. 4, 2015
(reporting that the Idaho Department of Fish and Game is beginning to rely on scat analysis in
additional to telemetry in tracking wolves).
256. Zoe Jewell and Sky Alibhai of Duke University have promoted a noninvasive technique
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biologists and managers on the ground,257 or the use of a “howl box” to
determine the presence of wolves in the vicinity.258 If the purpose of
collaring wolves is to keep them away from livestock, there are many
other potentially viable alternatives.259 Only when the government
demonstrates that these less intrusive techniques would be insufficient
should the use of surveillance collars be permissible.260
C. Minimization
When obtaining permission to use highly intrusive surveillance
techniques such as wiretaps in criminal investigations, the government
must minimize both the scope and duration of the surveillance. For
example, a wiretap order usually directs police to conclude all
monitoring within 90 days and stop listening to a phone conversation
once it becomes clear that the topic of the conversation is not germane
to the investigation.261 Similar boundaries are appropriate for the use
of surveillance collars on wildlife.
For example, permits for
surveillance should have a finite duration; a period of a few months
should be the default unless the applicant makes a compelling showing
for a longer period. The present practice of indefinite surveillance—
that relies on footprint analysis to identify wild animals. See http://wildtrack.org/ (last visited on
July 24, 2016).
257. Andrews, supra note 10 (indicating that traditional wildlife tracking may be preferable
to telemetry collars in certain circumstances, because observations on the ground can gather a
wider range of information).
258. A howl box emits the sound of a wolf’s howl and records responses by any wolves in the
facility. Each response is distinctive and allows researchers to keep track of individual wolves.
Guthrie, supra note 88 (indicating that the howl box is efficient, inexpensive and less intrusive, so
it is “an improvement over existing devices”).
259. Stephens, supra note 33, at 951–52 (“Perhaps the most effective, and ultimately the most
intuitive, is to reduce the number of attractions for the wolves. Quick and effective handling of
dead, diseased, or dying livestock and the management of calving, which are all enticing to
predators, can significantly reduce the chance of attracting wolves. The use of guard dogs has
also been shown to be an effective measure in preventing wolf predation as the canine presence
may act as a deterrent, and dogs can be effective in alerting humans when predators enter the
area. The use of barriers such as permanent or portable fencing and fladry, the hanging of red or
orange cloth flags at eighteen-inch intervals along a thin rope, have proven effective under a
variety of circumstances . . . . Range riders patrol livestock herds, keeping track of their location
with respect to the are wolf packs, and taking proactive measures such as removing carcasses
quickly. Their presence is generally effective in deterring wolves from entering the area, as wolves
actively avoid humans.”).
260. In Australia, the ethical rules for radio tracking direct wildlife managers to “[u]se
alternative methods whenever possible.” Radio Tracking Wildlife Research, ANIMAL ETHICS
INFOLINK, www.animalethics.org.au/policies-and-guideliens/widlife-research/radio-tracking (last
visited on July 11, 2016) (setting forth various guidelines for the use of radio tracking devices).
261. Arthur and Hunter, supra note 253 (discussing minimization requirement).
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continuing until the demise of the wolf or the batteries—allows for
privacy violations that are too attenuated from the original rationale
for surveillance.262 Additionally, researchers should make use of new
remote-release technology that frees a wolf from its collar upon
expiration of a preprogrammed time period or receipt of an electronic
signal from a remote location.263 Researchers should also stop utilizing
data from an active surveillance collar during time periods when the
rationale for surveillance is inapplicable. For instance, in a research
project focusing on wolves’ possible predation of an endangered
species in area A, researchers should not monitor the signals from
collars when the wolves are far away in area B. Just as in the case of a
wiretap, the propriety of collar surveillance depends on dynamic
circumstances. The initial order should not provide carte blanche for
ongoing surveillance at the sole discretion of the researchers.
D. Review by Neutral, Detached Authority
Police seeking to infringe human privacy in a criminal
investigation—for example, by conducting surveillance in an area such
as a residence—must first obtain authorization from a judicial
officer.264
Involving a neutral, detached official in screening
applications for such surveillance provides a system of checks and
balances that safeguards privacy.265 If officers were not accountable to
a neutral third party, their haste or institutional interests might lead
them to undervalue the privacy of the subjects under investigation.266

262. See, e.g., Mark Freeman, OR-7 Could Be Recollared Next Month, MEDFORD MAIL
TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 2014 (indicating that Oregon’s most famous wolf, OR-7, had worn the same
surveillance collar for three and a half years).
263. Surveillance collars are now available that drop off automatically when they receive a
signal from the researcher or manager who is monitoring data from the collar. E.g,, website of
Lotek Fish and Wilderness Monitoring, www.lotek.com/dropoff.htm (last visited on July 24, 2016)
(explaining that drop-off mechanism avoids the need for recapture in order to remove the collar).
264. There are exceptions to the warrant requirement for certain settings in which people
have a diminished expectation of privacy, such as schools, prisons, automobiles, border
checkpoints, airports, heavily regulated industries, etc. See JOSHUA DRESSLER AND ALAN
MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE VOL. 1: INVESTIGATION 297–317 (2010).
265. Id. at 161 (summarizing the law and indicating that “if people are going to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures, as the Fourth
Amendment guarantees, a neutral party—the judge, and not the police officer (no, for that
matter, the person whose privacy or security is at risk)—should make the initial determination
whether there is sufficient basis to intrude on an individual’s security”).
266. Mona Shokrai, Double-Trouble: The Underregulation of Surreptitious Video Surveillance
in Conjunction with the Use of Snitches in Domestic Government Investigations, 13 RICHMOND J.
L. & TECH. 3, 55 (2006) (indicating that requirement of authorization by neutral, detached officer
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In the case of wildlife biologists, the vast majority have noble interests,
but some are unduly enthusiastic about the use of surveillance
collars.267 This enthusiasm might desensitize them to the importance
of wildlife privacy. Whereas police officers know they will eventually
face the scrutiny of a defense attorney in an adversarial proceeding if
their seized evidence leads to prosecution, it is unlikely that wildlife
researchers will ever be subjected to such legal scrutiny in representing
the interests of the wildlife they have monitored. These circumstances
heighten the need for outside review at the outset of the investigation.
The requirement of review by an IACUC, while not universally
applicable, demonstrates that Congress recognizes the value of
external accountability for researchers who work with animals.268 Such
a requirement should extend to all uses of wildlife surveillance
collars.269
E. Return and Inventory
In the criminal justice system, a police officer who obtains a search
warrant must provide the issuing authority with a “return and
inventory” after executing the warrant.270 In other words, the officer
must report on what the search found.271 This procedure provides an
incentive for candor and caution in applications, because the results
may contradict an exaggerated argument for a search. Requiring a
“return and inventory” also helps to educate the official who is
determining whether to issue search warrants. The official can learn
about the patterns of criminal activity in the area and the
trustworthiness of officers who frequently apply for warrants.
Importing the same requirements to animal surveillance would
improve the accountability of applicants and help the issuing
authorities learn more about the tendencies of the animals under
surveillance. In time, these safeguards could reduce surveillance to a

reduces potential for police bias in favor of surveillance); see Smith, supra note 243 (discussing
importance of warrant requirement in “placing a check on the unlimited discretion otherwise
afforded officers,” and thereby reducing abuse of surveillance technology”); Phyllis Bookspan
Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VANDERBILT L.
REV. 473, 529 (1991) (arguing that judicial review “counterattacks the passions of the moment”).
267. Supra, notes 68–76 and accompanying text.
268. Supra, note 167.
269. Currently the involvement of IACUCs is not mandatory for all use of surveillance collars
on wildlife. See supra notes 159–73 and accompanying text.
270. FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 41(f) (requiring return and inventory).
271. Id.
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minimum and best protect animals’ privacy. The compilation of all
these reports in a central database would reduce the likelihood of
duplicative research, and would thereby help to reduce surveillance in
the long run.272
F. Separate Regulation of Restraint on Movement
Police officers who obtain permission to conduct long-term
electronic surveillance do not have blanket authorization to imprison
any person they encounter during that surveillance.273 Similarly, when
wildlife researchers obtain a permit to use surveillance collars for
monitoring wildlife, this permit should not automatically authorize
researchers to immobilize, capture and move the animals however they
see fit. Wolves naturally migrate, which suggests limitations on their
range could be harmful to their health.274 The issuing authority should
generally disfavor the use of collars with tranquilizer darts and only
allow the use such collars in a permit with a clearly defined list of
contingencies that would warrant immobilization. The wholesale
movement or enclosure of a wildlife population should require entirely
separate authorization. Shock collars are so inconsistent with our
understanding of “wildness” that it is hard to imagine any justification
for the use of such a technique on a wild animal. In any event, judicial
authorization should be necessary.
G. Prohibition of Lethal Measures Absent Exigency
No police officer would assume that a surveillance warrant carries
with it the authorization to execute the person who is the subject of the
surveillance. Oddly, however, some wildlife managers, who collar
wolves for the ostensible reason of protecting them later, use the
collars to track down and kill the same wolves when management
objectives change.275 Laws should forbid the use of surveillance collars

272. See Joslin, supra note 83, at 216 (arguing that wildlife biologists should refrain from
additional capturing and collaring of wild animals except when this intervention is absolutely
necessary to achieve beneficial results for the animals).
273. Detaining a person suspected of criminal activity requires that an officer reasonably
suspect his criminality or otherwise have probable cause to arrest him. Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806 at 809 (reciting that defendants alleged that their arresting officer lacked reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to seize their vehicle). Absent indicia supporting either belief, a
surveilled person cannot be detained by an officer.
274. See Jewell, supra, note 103 (indicating that limitations on movement can harm wolves’
health).
275. See Ketcham supra, note 108.
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to kill wolves unless separate authorization is obtained from the same
issuing authority. If the issuing authority determines that the
surveillance application was a ruse to enable the killing of the subject
wolves,276 the authority should immediately require the remote release
of the collars in question. Hopefully, the policy of minimization277
would reduce the opportunistic use of high-tech surveillance gear for
the purpose of stalking and killing collared animals. There are few
spectacles in wildlife management that are more shameful—and more
unsportsmanlike—than the shooting of a collared wolf by a wildlife
manager who once purported to protect the wolf. Of course, the killing
of a collared animal would still be permissible if that animal poses an
imminent lethal threat to a human being (a circumstance that also
permits the use of deadly force against a human suspect under current
law).278
H. Sanctions for Noncompliance
Consistent enforcement of bright-line rules is necessary to protect
against invasions of privacy.279 In the context of criminal investigations,
police officers who violate rules for searches and surveillance face a
range of penalties. This includes suppression at trial of any evidence
that is the “fruit of the poisonous tree.”280 Animals have no standing
to sue281 and few trials rely on evidence derived from surveillance of
animals. Therefore, a different set of penalties is necessary to assure
compliance with wildlife surveillance rules. Sanctions could include
fines and “suppression” of data via a court injunction against
publication or dissemination.282 Courts might also enjoin further
276. Some critics have suggested that Idaho’s unauthorized use of surveillance collars in 2016
was such a ruse. See Bourdeaux supra, note 159.
277. The minimization requirement would limit the duration of permissible surveillance, and
would reduce the number of collared wolves at any given instant in time. Freeman, supra note
262.
278. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
279. Joshua Levy, Towards a Brighter Fourth Amendment: Privacy and Technology Change,
16 VA. J. L. & TECH. 499, 513 (2011) (urging that “bright line Fourth Amendment rules are the
only way to adequately protect privacy against new technologies” because “such rules enable
police to know precisely how far they can intrude when conducting an investigation and,
importantly, where they cannot intrude”).
280. DRESSLER, supra note 271, at 347-92.
281. Babcock, supra note 188, at 18 (arguing that nature “cannot gain access to the courts to
protect itself”).
282. An example of the suppression remedy is the order of the U.S. District Court that
reviewed the state of Idaho’s unlawful use of surveillance collars on wolves in the Frank Church
Wilderness. See supra, n. 153-57. The court not only enjoined future use of the surveillance
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surveillance by the offending officials. Courts could forbid such
officials from venturing back into wilderness areas for a certain time
period after their violations. In an extreme case of willful failure to
follow surveillance regulations, the court might even outfit the
offending official with an electronic ankle bracelet to ensure against
any return to the wilderness—a fitting penalty that would be likely to
increase the official’s sensitivity to the intrusiveness of surveillance
technology.283
VI. RESPONSES TO FORESEEABLE OBJECTIONS
A number of objections to this Article’s arguments are likely. One
possible criticism is that the reduced use of surveillance collars could
harm wolves. Proponents of collaring argue that it is necessary for
scientific research that will improve wolves’ odds of survival.284 The
value of continued research based on animal telemetry is unclear,
however.285 In fact, the use of collars sometimes results in inaccurate
data because the collars distort wolves’ behavior.286 If scientists can
demonstrate a particularized need for research involving collars and
that the value of it would exceed the hardship on the wolves, the
scientists could still obtain authorization for the research under the
rules proposed in this Article.287 When collaring is not available, there
are several alternate means of monitoring wolves, including visual
observation, scat analysis, footprint tracking, and the utilization of
“howl boxes.”288 Recent evidence suggests that collars are not
necessary to keep wolves safe from people or other predators. In
Europe, where the density of human settlement is much higher than in
collars on wolves in this area, but the court also ordered destruction of the data obtained from
the collars up to that point. According to U.S. District Judge B. Lynn Winmill, “The only remedy
that will directly address the ongoing harm is an order requiring destruction of the data.”
Wilderness Watch v. Vilsack, __ F.Supp. 3d ___, 2017 WL 241320 *9 (Jan. 18, 2017).
283. C.f. Samuel Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L. J.
1344, 1364-82 (2014) (advocating the wider use of GPS tracking devices on humans in lieu of
pretrial detention).
284. Sarah Skinner, Tracking Collars: The Good, the Bad, and the Necessary, California
Wolves (Oct. 2, 2014), https://californiawolves.wordpress.com/2014/10/02/tracking-collars-thegood-the-bad-and-the-necessary/ (arguing that a lone wolf being collared is “the best thing that
could have happened” to it).
285. Jewell, supra note 179, at 505.
286. Id. at 502–05 (mentioning that invasive monitoring techniques can lead to misleading
results because these techniques alter animals’ behavior;).
287. See Joslin, supra note 82, at 216.
288. Kessler, supra note 255; Jewell, supra note 256; Andrews, supra note 10; Guthrie, supra
note 86.
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the U.S., government officials do not rely as heavily on surveillance
collars to manage wolves and the human and wolf populations manage
to coexist peacefully.289
Another foreseeable objection is that restricting the use of collars
would increase wolves’ conflicts vís-a-vís humans and livestock. But,
wolves have almost never attacked humans290 and the practice of
collaring wolves could lead to habituation that might draw wolves
closer to human communities.291 Some authors suggest that ranchers
have exaggerated predation of livestock by wolves;292 these authors
also point out that coyotes and domestic dogs kill more livestock than
do wolves.293 The strategy of collaring and culling wolves to reduce
livestock predation could perhaps prove counterproductive, because
disruption of packs sometimes leads to desperation that actually
289. Guillaume Chapron, et al., Recovery of Large Carnivores in Europe’s Modern HumanDominated Landscapes, SCIENCE MAGAZINE, (Dec. 2014) (reporting that European wolves are
“successful in adapting to human-dominated landscapes”; these wolves are thriving even though
“Europe hosts twice as many wolves as the contiguous United States . . . despite being half the
size . . . and more than twice as densely populated”).
290. “While people have a strong hatred for the animals, wolf contacts with humans are fairly
rare and extremely unlikely to result in harm to the person. In fact, a study of wolf-human
encounters in Alaska and Canada (where the largest gray wolf populations exist) found that over
the 100 years there have been fewer than twenty reported cases of unprovoked wolves attacking
humans (out of eighty cases of published wolf-human interactions), none of which resulted in a
fatality. These findings suggest that humans may little to fear from wolves.” Brandon Berrett, Is
Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar Correct that Successful State Management of Recovered Rocky
Mountain Gray Wolves Is Not Compatible with the Endangered Species Act? 47 IDAHO L. REV.
596, 598 (2011); see Whitney Stohr, Trophic Cascades and Private Property: The Challenges of a
Regulatory Balancing Act and Lessons the UK Can Learn from the Reintroduction of the American
Gray Wolf, 2 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 15, 40 (2012) (“Folklore and exaggerated news reports
are largely to blame for the public’s view of wolves as a danger to humans. Wolf attacks are
extraordinarily rare . . .”); Craig Enochs, Gone Today, Here Tomorrow: Policy and Issues
Surrounding Wildlife Reintroduction, 4 HASTINGS WEST-NORTHWEST J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 91,
101 (1997) (“Rather than preying on humans, wolves actually avoid human contact”).
291. Duane, supra note 13; Klinkenborg, supra note 141 and accompanying text.
292. See, e.g., Stohr, supra note 290, at 47 (suggesting that “the frequency of livestock
depredation by wolves is significantly exaggerated by those opposed to reintroduction
programs”).
293. Wendy Keefover, Government Report: Less Than 1% of Cattle Killed by Native
Carnivores and Domestic Dogs, HUFFINGTON POST, July 18, 2011 (“Less than a quarter of one
percent, 0.23%, of the American cattle inventory was lost to native carnivores and dogs in 2010,
according to a Department of Agriculture report released last week. These findings call into
question the tens of millions per year taxpayers and livestock growers spend on lethal control of
native carnivores. The government’s own data show that the real killers of cattle are not a few
endangered wolves or other wildlife—they’re illness and weather.”); Thrower, supra note 31, at
348 (“However, wolves are not the primary predators of livestock. In both cattle and sheep
deaths, U.S.D.A. statistics show that coyotes make up the majority carnivore group—domestic
dogs come in second”).
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increases predation on domesticated animals.294 Ranchers have many
other less invasive means of protecting livestock from wolves.295 When
wolves do attack livestock, environmental groups compensate ranchers
for the value of lost animals.296
Some might argue that it is inappropriate to extend rules designed
for criminal investigations to the context of wildlife surveillance, in part
because fish and game officials do not have an adversarial relationship
with wildlife the way police are adversarial to suspected criminals.
However, some state officials who utilize surveillance collars are
indeed adversarial toward wolves.297 Even those who have genuine
concern for helping wolves are sometimes too enthusiastic about
surveillance collars and too insensitive to the hardships that this
technology causes for collared animals.298 The extension of rules from
criminal procedure to wildlife surveillance is not so incongruous,
especially after wildlife biologists decided to import technology from
the world of criminal investigation. This Article does not impute bad
faith to wildlife managers, nor does it deny them access to the
technology for wildlife surveillance. Rather, it proposes that the use of
such technology should require proof of a particularized need, just as
it does in the context of criminal investigation.
Other critics might contend this Article does not go far enough,
because it derives privacy from a statutory penumbra rather than
insisting on the extension of rights to animals. There can be no doubt
that animal rights, if enshrined in law, would be more efficacious than
the policies proposed in this Article. The campaign for animal rights is
commendable and finds no opposition here. Others have criticized the
movement, however.299 Even advocates for animals concede that legal

294. Robert Wieglas & Kaylie Peebles, Effects of Wolf Mortality on Livestock Depredations,
PLOS ONE, Dec. 3, 2014 (reporting findings that wolf mortality disrupted packs and led
remaining wolves to kill livestock that they otherwise would have avoided).
295. Stohr, supra note 290, at 40.
296. Id. at 47. (discussing compensation programs for ranchers who lose livestock to wolves).
297. Robbins, supra note 28; Fischman, supra note 29; Taibbi, supra note 30.
298. Fischman, supra note 29; Busch, supra note 74; Duane, supra note 13; Henson, supra note
72; Benson, supra note 74.
299. As Judge Richard Posner declared in the Yale Law Journal, “There is a sad poverty of
imagination in an approach to animal protection that can think of it only on the model of the civil
rights movement.” Posner, supra note 209, at 539. “The most aggressive implementations of
animal-rights thinking would undoubtedly benefit animals more [than incremental reform, but]
those implementations are unlikely, so the modest alternatives are worth serious consideration.
We may overlook this simple point, however much we love animals, if we listen too raptly to the
siren song of ‘animal rights.’” Id. at 541.
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recognition of animal rights seems unlikely in the imminent future.300
This Article aspires to help in the near term by laying a preliminary
groundwork301 for recognizing wildlife privacy—a groundwork that a
rights-based regime may one day supersede. This Article’s policybased approach permits a broader analysis than does a rights-based
approach. As Professor Sonu Bedi has observed, the focus on rights
can divert attention from the flawed rationale for government
policies302 and advocates for wolves need to shine a light on the
irrational justification for subjugation of these animals. 303
A final possible criticism is that this Article errs by limiting its
privacy doctrine to wildlife, excluding domesticated animals and
livestock. This Article does not purport to explore the full extent of
the privacy doctrine. As noted in the introduction, space does not
permit a sweeping analysis of how the privacy doctrine might
potentially affect other animals in different contexts. This Article has
focused on wildlife, in part because wild animals seem to have the
strongest claim for privacy. Future scholarship might address whether
privacy should extend to livestock, household pets and zoo animals.304

300. Steven Wise “is the first to admit that his tactics haven’t proven successful so far.” Lewis
Beale, The Case for Treating Animals as Humans, THE DAILY BEAST, May 26, 2016, http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/26/the-case-for-treating-animals-as-humans.html. Chris
Green, executive director of Harvard’s Animal Law and Policy Program, is a former student of
Wise and is a strong voice for animal protection. He believes “the jury is still out” on animal
rights. Id.
301. Colb and Dorf criticize incrementalism in the context of advocacy for animal welfare,
but do suggest that some principled incrementalism could be useful. Supra note 237 at 143–45
(generally expressing pessimism about viability of incrementalism as a strategy for reforming
animal exploitation, but advocating “laws that reduce governmental support for harmful
practices”; such advocacy amounts to “incremental-but-uncompromising activism”). Green notes
that some advocates for animal rights consider arguments for animal welfare to be akin to putting
“nicer wallpaper at a prison,” but Green believes that arguments to improve the treatment of wild
animals might have traction over the next five years. See Beale supra note 300.
302. Bedi criticizes the preoccupation with rights, and suggests that scrutiny of the
justification for policies could eliminate the need to resort to rights. He offers the compelling
example of morals legislation – that is, legislation lacking a justification in the prevention of
demonstrable harm. He argues that a privacy right should not be necessary to overturn a law
forbidding consensual homosexual relations between adults, because the lack of justification for
such a law should be a sufficient basis on which to overturn it. The repudiation of improper
justification renders the right obsolete. BEDI, supra note 226, at 149.
303. Humans have persecuted wolves for centuries due in large part to irrational hatred.
Klinkenborg, supra note 146 and accompanying text. The currently pervasive use of surveillance
collars is not always justifiable based on the demonstrable harm posed by unmonitored wolves
(e.g., possible predation on humans and livestock). Jewell, supra note 175 at 505 and
accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., COLB, supra note 230, at 184–87 (raising questions about ethics of sterilizing
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Perhaps animal privacy should be universal, or perhaps it should vary
according to setting like human privacy does.305
CONCLUSION
It is fitting to close an article about lupine privacy by citing a case
in which a Wolf was a party. In Wolf v. Colorado, the Supreme Court
insisted on safeguarding “the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary
intrusion” by the government.306 Intrusive surveillance conducted
“without authority of law but solely on the authority of police, did not
need the commentary of recent history to be condemned . . .”307 Such
surveillance offends one of the most basic principles on which
Americans have agreed since the founding of this country: the
government’s ability to intrude should depend on judicial
authorization following a particularized showing of need.
This Article has argued that wild animals deserve privacy—not the
same degree of privacy that humans enjoy, but a lesser amount that is
consistent with the seclusion and autonomy one would expect in the
wild. The experience of the gray wolf in the United States illustrates
the danger of infringing privacy. A doctrine of wildlife privacy derives
naturally from statutes that protect the welfare of animals. Decades of
research have shown that privacy is indispensable to the wellbeing of
animals.
Implementing the doctrine of wildlife privacy requires that we
borrow certain notions from the rules of criminal procedure. These
include the requirements of balancing government need versus privacy
interests, showing the insufficiency of alternatives, minimizing
surveillance to the extent possible, submitting applications for review

companionate animals).
305. DRESSLER, supra note 264; United States v. Knotts, 480 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983)
(indicating that the legality of GPS surveillance depends on the location where the surveillance
takes place, because people have more privacy in certain locations); see Timothy Horstmann,
Protecting Traditional Privacy Rights in a Brave New Digital World: The Threat Posed by Digital
Phone-Cameras and What States Should Do to Stop It, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 739. 746 (2007)
(noting that, under one common view, “whether a person has an expectation of privacy depends
on that person’s physical location”); cf. Kevin Winters, A Proposed Amendment to the Military
Rules of Evidence on Inspections and the Probable Cause Search Standard for Operational Units,
40 NAVAL L. REV. 143, 153 (1993) (“[A] man’s home is usually given greater constitutional
protection than his prison cell; a child at home or on the street has greater constitutional
protection than a child at school; and courts are loath to cloak automobiles with traditional fourth
amendment protection.”).
306. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
307. Id.

Lininger - For Publication (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2017]

UNLOCKING THE “VIRTUAL CAGE”

6/7/2017 1:30 PM

263

by neutral third parties, and furnishing a report of the information
obtained. Other necessary reforms include a requirement of separate
authorization for restraints on movement, as well as a prohibition on
attaching surveillance collars simply to track and kill wolves. The
uniform adoption of such rules would help to establish the principle
that privacy should be the norm in the wilderness.
An animal is either wild or it is not. The idea of partial wildness308
is fanciful, like partial pregnancy or partial death. We do have a word
for the domesticated version of a wolf. That animal is a dog. A dog
generally wears a collar.309 A wolf should not — absent a particularized,
compelling justification that overrides the wolf’s privacy.

308. See Mooallem, supra note 103, at 4 (“We are gardening the wilderness”).
309. Appellee’s Answer Brief, Comins v. Van Voorhis, 2012 WL 12285258 *51 (Fla. App.
Nov. 12, 2012) (challenging man’s claim that he shot a dog because he mistook it for a wolf; the
collar showed the animal was “domesticated” and “belied” any claim that it might be a wolf).

